RIYADH, 23 November — The Taleban retreat from their city fortresses and their alleged avowal to regroup and fight as guerrillas seems to meet with some appreciation in the East and West. The Taleban probably believe that they will receive help from across the Pakistan border in the form of money, supplies, and reinforcements. The problem for the West is a propensity to impose Western assumptions, values and political heritage on foreign ideology.
Before the recent Northern Alliance’s successes, many news media reported that the Taleban controlled over 90 percent of the territory in Afghanistan. After the US bombing campaign shifted from the attack on command and control nodes and air defense systems, many news media began to show maps with large sections of active opposition forces and large sections of contested areas. It is now believed that the Taleban had little control over much of the countryside and maintained their power base in the major cities.
Supporting the Northern Alliance was the key to victory in Afghanistan. However, a Washington concern that the Northern Alliance could not finish the job was based on the exaggerated belief that there was a monolithic social and political homogeneity of the Pashtun tribes.
The success of the US airstrikes on Taleban front line positions coupled with the Northern Alliance’s ground offensive was a surprise to many in the West. Many used the Kosovo air campaign as an example and concluded that a long winter air campaign lay ahead with more bombing. Kosovo would have been over in 30 days if a ground campaign had been part of the plan.
The Taleban are probably now seen, by a large portion of the Pashtun people, as a failed oppressive system that existed for the sole purpose of perpetuating itself and to kill or destroy any religious or political thought that might challenge them.
As it turned out the Taleban are far less "fearsome" as the Western media made them out to be. Additionally, the Taleban had a very weak military command structure. They had no firm chain of command. They had no supporting general staff. They had no trained supply and logistics staff. The Taleban Intelligence organizations was deeply influenced by the Pakistani Intelligence Service. There were no major reserves to shift to strategic locations and certainly no planning level headquarters that could have directed the changing, back and forth campaign.
It is now plain that the Taleban do not enjoy the support of the majority of the various ethnic tribes and many of the Pashtun clan do not want the Taleban anymore. It is a known fact that many of the Pashtun tribal leaders have already switched sides.
Within days of the Northern Alliance taking Kabul, Afghanistan became a patchwork of isolated conflicts and ethnic rivalries.
It is now reported in the Western press that the Taleban will revert to "guerrilla warfare." It has been mistakenly reported that it was guerrilla warfare that brought them to power in 1996.
This is most definitely not the case. The Taleban were swept into power by buying off local commanders or by defections of various tribes. The Taleban swept from city to city bypassing the dispersed Mujahadeen and had control of all the power centers in a relative short period of time. The displeasure of many of the population against the Mujahadeen also played a role.
Guerrilla warfare will be new to the Taleban. Guerrilla warfare is only a basic military tactic aimed at harassing an adversary. The Taleban will need a politically unifying philosophy or common objective to rally people to their cause and support a guerrilla movement.
Mao Tse-Tung, the famous Chinese guerrilla leader/philosopher, once said that the guerrillas must be like fish in a sea made up of the local people, the guerrillas cannot live without the (sea) people.
The objective in conventional warfare is terrain and the center of gravity of political and military power. This usually means to start with the military forces that support and protect the political leadership and then cutting off the head of the political apparatus. In unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, the objective is the people. Without local support of the people, there will no intelligence collection, no resupply, no recruits, and no popular uprising.
Guerrillas also need sanctuaries for rest and recuperation. It is doubtful that Pakistan will give sanctuary to the Taleban after the devastating humiliation they just received from the Taleban.
There are some news media reports that the Mujahadeen’s success over the Soviets may be a model for the future. It must be remembered that the Mujahadeen won with massive financial and military support from foreign countries. The Stinger, surface-to-air missile launcher played a major role in neutralizing Soviet air power. The Taleban and Al-Qaeda will not get the same kind of support.
Additionally, allegiances in Afghanistan can be easily bought for a price. From the "Great Game" of the 19th Century, Pashtuns have been easily divided. They are famous for temporary loyalties, shifting alliances and deceit.
The real threat to immediate peace in Afghanistan are the Al-Qaeda "foreign mercenaries." It is reported that the Al-Qaeda members include fighters of various nationalities: Arabs, Chechens, Pakistanis, Chinese, and from former Soviet Republics with Muslim minorities.
Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization have few friends among the Afghans. For those who can escape the traps they currently find themselves in, they most certainly will flee to the nearest border. There will be no Al-Qaeda mercenaries taking to the hills to continue the fight.
Pakistan may not be allowed to be involved in the formation of any post-Taleban government because of its sponsorship of the Taleban. The price that Pakistan will demand for its continued support to the Allied cause may be hard to pay.
The US has to decide if it will fall back into the failed paradigm of a Pakistani-brokered political regime or will the US apply new and imaginative thinking to the political realities of a multi-ethnic social structure with tribal leadership and political consensus.
There is also the distinct possibility of a partition of the country, which will only further divide the population. The unanticipated arrival of British and French forces at the air base outside Kabul may hasten the fragmentation of the country.
What lies ahead for the US and the Western Allies in their worldwide campaign against "terrorism"?
For all the reported changes in the US military and the Quadrennial Defense Review, the basic strategic and operational template remains the same as was seen in the Gulf War. Simply stated the US military is built on the necessity to defeat a large-scale military force with massed armor and superior air power.
However, the application of US special forces and precision air power may be a catalyst for reorienting US national security strategy.There is a new 4th generation of warfare that has on or before the Sept. 11, 2001, attack on the New York World Trade Center. That is another story.
