In what will be his first foreign trip as US vice president, Dick Cheney will embark on a 15-nation tour starting this week amid reports that he will try to rally support for what Washington calls “Phase II” of the war on terrorism. And that means action to bring about a change of regime in Baghdad. Cheney’s first port of call will be London where British Prime Minister Tony Blair has emerged as the United States’ most steadfast ally. Once British support for action in Iraq is assured, the American leader will take the message to a number of Arab capitals.
What will Cheney tell the Arabs? And what the Arabs should tell Cheney?
These are some of the questions evoked by the US vice president’s impending diplomatic sortie.
Cheney is likely to remind the Arabs that the US won the first phase of the war against terrorism without the support of its traditional Arab allies. Afghanistan represented the first instance in almost 30 years in which the US acted in a Muslim country without having its Arab allies on its side. What we saw in Afghanistan is, in fact, the emergence of a new pattern of alliances centered on the United States. Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, only Britain, Canada, Italy and Turkey, among the founding members, actively backed the US. France, Germany, the Benelux nations and Norway stayed on the sidelines, to suck their thumb or grumble. But the US got strong, and strangely unnoticed, support, from NATO’s newest members. The Spaniards, the Poles, the Czechs and the Hungarians filled the gaps left by the French, the Germans and the Dutch. This means that we now have a two-tier NATO: one tier is with the US all the way, while the other stays on the sidelines. Outside NATO, the US received energetic support from Australia and New Zealand and, more surprisingly, Russia and India.
Cheney will thus inform the Arabs that the US is prepared to form and disband alliances on a case-by-case basis. This is a return to the doctrine that nations have no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. The US leader will then proceed to tell the Arabs that the Bush administration is determined to force regimes likely to pose a threat to American interests and security, to change their strategies. Where such change is not forthcoming, the US will use “all means necessary” to remove those regimes. As far as the so-called “ Evil Three” are concerned, the US still believes that two of them, Iran and North Korea, can be goaded into changing their policies while the third, Iraq, is beyond all hope of reform.
He will then ask a simple question: We are going to topple Saddam Hussein. Will you help us do it or fight on his side or stay neutral?
Clearly this is a tough “trilemma”. To help US change the regime in Iraq could set a precedent that some Arab leaders may ponder with dismay. On the other hand, no Arab leader would be insane enough to fight to save Saddam Hussein from reaping the harvest he has sown. The third option, staying neutral, is equally bad. The neutrals would have no say in the shape of a future Iraqi regime that may quickly emerge as the key US ally in the Arab world.
Iraq is potentially rich enough and demographically strong enough to marginalize Washington’s existing Arab allies. A new Iraq could become the compass of a new architecture for the entire Middle East. The neutrals could also face the wrath of sections of their own population for not trying to prevent intervention in Iraq. History shows that neutrals often end up as double losers. (The only exception has been Switzerland because all countries needed it for money laundering and secret negotiations!)
The hard choice that faces the Arabs comes at the worst possible moment. The Cold War is over and the Arabs can no longer threaten one bloc by winking at the other. The use of oil as a political weapon is also old history. Any attempt to cut the flow of oil would simply lead to loss of markets, some permanently, for the Arab members of the OPEC. None of the oil-rich Arab states has the kind of reserves needed to give a policy of turning the oil taps off a snowflake’s chance in hell. Worse still, the Arabs have absolutely no strategy. Unless a miracle happens at the Beirut summit, the Arabs are likely to continue muddling on, unable to adopt clear policies on any of the key issues that concerns them.
As far as action on Iraq is concerned, the pattern of a new alliance is already taking shape. Within the region, Turkey has indicated its readiness to support the US. Iran, whose leaders are realists and care little about ideology when their survival is threatened, will be as cooperative on Iraq as they were in Afghanistan, albeit quietly. Tehran will also see the destruction of the Mujahedeen Khalq, an armed exile group based in Iraq, as an added bonus for itself as was the case with the Taleban in Afghanistan. Several of the smaller Arab countries, notably Jordan, will also join in, provided they are convinced that the US is determined to topple Saddam Hussein.
Outside the region, France, Germany, and the Benelux will make some anti-American noise but would take absolutely no action to save Saddam. (Even those countries may change position soon, if the right-of-center parties win the elections scheduled in France, Germany and Holland.) The rest of NATO, especially Britain, Spain, Italy and the new members from Central Europe, will be on the side of the US, as will Australia and New Zealand.
One big question mark concerns Russia. From conversations with several Russian policy-makers and analysts in recent weeks, my guess is that President Vladimir Putin will back the US action in exchange for promises of a Russian share in shaping the future regime in Iraq. This is what happened in Afghanistan where Moscow was consulted at all stages of forming the Hamid Karzai administration.
Do the Arabs have any option other than joining the US unconditionally or being shut out of events?
I think they do. Arab leaders should tell Cheney that a new geopolitical architecture for the region couldn’t take shape unless there is movement on the Palestinian issue also. There is also the fact that as long as Golan remains under Israeli occupation, there will be little chance of massive reforms in Syria. A package that includes a change of regime in Baghdad along with the prospect of a Palestinian state would be far more acceptable, and ultimately more efficient because it will coincide Arab and American interests.
And that is not all. It is important that the exact role that the US intends to play in the region be established and subjected to normal treaties and agreements. Washington’s long-term interest dictates the creation of regional security structures that would render American military presence unnecessary.
The truth is that the US can win any war against either Iraq or Iran, or both, at the moment. But that could lead to the creation of a US imperium in the region. The US, however, is not designed as a power to create and protect imperial possessions for a long time. It is most effective when it intervenes on the side of regional allies —as was the case in the both world wars — on a short-term basis.
The Arabs should tell Cheney: We are ready to be your allies in the context of a global plan to reorganize and stabilize what has been one of the world’s hottest trouble spots for decades. But do not expect us to act as extras in a limited scenario for saloon-style shootout that you may have scripted for ulterior motives.
The Arabs could quote Winston Churchill who said: I love the Americans except when they act as Yankees!
