ISLAMABAD, 17 June — Pakistan President Parvez Musharraf found himself caught in a tough situation. The May killings in Kaluchak translated into an international chorus that Pakistan stop “cross-border” terrorism across the LoC. Pakistan was also asked to dismantle the “apparatus of terrorism” training “jihadis.” This was the Indian argument. International community including Musharraf’s friends in the West bought into the argument.
But Musharraf believes all is not lost. If he responded by curbing cross-border infiltration along the Line of Control, that could be seen as an admission that Islamabad has had a far greater control over the intrusions than it has been willing to admit. Would it mean that India was right to accuse it of abetting infiltration? Was the Western clamoring that Pakistan was supporting cross-border terrorism more credible than Islamabad was willing to concede? Maybe yes. But with a difference. A situation from which Musharraf can extract some opportunity on the Kashmir question.
He has sought a quid pro quo from the US and other countries like the UK and Russia. Any end to militancy and cross-border infiltration to the extent that Pakistan can control it, should be reciprocated by the Indian government. A dialogue on all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir.
In Almaty meanwhile, Musharraf made the first comprehensive statement on the issue. Linking the LoC infiltration to the Kashmiris’ right to self-determination, he repeated his offer of talks to Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee. At the June 4 press conference he said there is no infiltration across the LoC now. He also said the Americans, who have a neutral technology, can verify this. India, expectedly, rejected external monitors, but unexpectedly, Vajpayee conceded the possibility of a joint Indo-Pakistan patrolling along the LoC.
For now however the promise he has sought from the US remains unclear, but for his attempt to stop infiltration he has been lauded by Washington, Moscow, EU, Beijing, even Delhi. The promised quid pro quo is of tangible strategic and political significance for Musharraf but as of now there is little to show for the promised benefits.
The Indian decision allowing Pakistani flights in its airspace and the recalling of its naval warships have been hailed, but for Pakistan these are only cosmetic measures.
As a practical mechanism for verifying infiltration, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has proposed joint surveillance by India, Pakistan, the US and the UK. While the Indian response is awaited, it has created a dilemma for Delhi. Having proclaimed it the eastern war against terrorism, turning down the proposal may be difficult for it. As the Kashmir issue becomes increasingly internationalized, India can no longer play without rules. It will have to accept some compromise formula justified by the US in pursuit of its anti-terrorism war.
While Islamabad welcomes the move, it faces the challenge of making it the first step toward initiating a credible political process to reduce human rights violations, have the Kashmir struggle acknowledged as indigenous and bring Delhi to the negotiating table.
In the immediate context, the operation’s credibility will depend on the transparency of the process, inclusion of all parties concerned and the broader Indian moves on Kashmir. For if India tries to crush the indigenous political movement in the state to the complete indifference of the global community, then Musharraf’s quid pro quo plan will not have worked.
Meanwhile India’s policy will have been on track: End the LoC infiltration, militarily crush the indigenous armed struggle and paralyze the freedom movement. Of the seven All Party Hurriyat Conference leaders, three are behind bars and one has been killed.
The second rung leadership has long been jailed. In October, the state polls conducted in a controlled‚ military and political environment will show a high voter turnout. Delhi will have demonstrated to the world that Islamabad alone was the troublemaker. The Kashmir problem will have been resolved.
Musharraf’s commitment on the LoC was to further political settlement, not give India the opportunity to quash indigenous avenues for a political resolution. If India is not willing to see the link then Pakistan cannot guarantee its part of the commitment. The Musharraf government will be branded a traitor by the Pakistanis supporting the Kashmiri struggle and the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC banking on Pakistan’s support to end Indian occupation.
If the US cannot protect the US-Mexican border and if the Israeli military could not stop the Hezbollah support to the Palestinians, then Musharraf’s faltering is entirely possible.
At home Musharraf has made a high risk move. Many Pakistanis and Kashmiris believe that without the gun the Kashmiri freedom struggle will be crushed by India. He is accused of selling out on Kashmir and becoming party to the US browbeating Pakistan into submission. In Muzaffarabad recently, thousands of people participated in a rally where Qazi Hussein Ahmed of the Jamaat-e-Islami declared, “We will keep on crossing the LoC as the struggle for Kashmir’s freedom continues.”
Musharraf’s high risk move deserves success. It could potentially be the first step toward pulling South Asia away from the shadows of hate, intolerance and underdevelopment.
