ISLAMABAD, 16 November 2002 — The postelection period in the country has not produced a quick and clean arrangement. The fast changing political scenario makes it difficult to predict with any certainty the exact composition of the ruling coalition. Based on recent moves and reports the chances of a Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) and Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition forming the government at the Center appears most likely. The establishment-supported Grand National Alliance would also be part of any future ruling coalition in which the PML-Q would form the centerpiece.
Pakistanis have witnessed a constantly changing political scene as negotiations between the major alliances, as well as between the government and these groupings continue.
Caught between their desire to see a stable and clean political setup and the simplistic yet widely publicized observations that delays in government formation reflects the weakness of the system, Pakistanis are showing impatience with the prolonged process of coalition politics — and with the politicians.
The key factors upon which the formation and to some extent the stability of the future government will be based are three. One, the actual convening of the National Assembly session. The authority to convene the session currently lies with the president. The convening of the session has been delayed because the main establishment-supported party, PML-Q, was unable to collect the numbers required in the Parliament to form government.
Negotiations with parties involve agreeing on the crucial power-sharing formula and also to some extent on the position of the parties on the Legal Framework Order (LFO). The delay in convening the session theoretically helps parties to cobble together greater numbers through additional negotiations. Also, the rumored lifting of the floor-crossing amendment could help members of various parties to cross over to the PML-Q.
While the responsibility for individuals or groups indulging in horse trading lies largely with the politicians themselves, it is indeed the president’s failure to convene the Assembly which prolongs the time available to politicians to break away from their parties.
This failure is deliberate. The president himself is keen to see a particular coalition arrangement in place before the Assembly is convened. Therefore he himself has been actively involved in meeting leaders from key political parties. His recent meeting with Qazi Hussain Ahmad was very significant. Signs of some breakthrough between the PML-Q and the MMA have been evident since then.
The second element that has delayed the formation of a government has been the actual intra-party negotiations to get the right numbers. All the three major parties — the PML-Q, the Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) and the MMA — have been negotiating with each other. The Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) which consists of the Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz group (PML-N) and PPPP have also been active. However, despite tough rhetoric against the army’s involvement in politics no major political groupings within or outside of the ARD have been able to evolve a consensus on the LFO.
At least no common position on the irreducible minimum has been coherently articulated. Also as part of its power politics the PPPP has shifted gears mid-stream. First after entering into negotiations with the MMA, the PPPP reportedly struck a discordant political note when its leadership maintained that it could not enter into an alliance with the MMA because of wide differences in foreign and domestic policy issues. Unless some other dramatic development takes place either a breakaway PPP faction or the MMA would join hands with PML-Q to form the government. And fairly soon.
The third element that has influenced party positions and the timing for government formation is the position of various parties on the Legal Framework Order. Of approximately 42 elements in the LFO, the three key ones are the dual charge of the president and the chief of army staff (COAS) held by Gen. Pervez Musharraf; the National Security Council (NSC) headed by the president; and the powers under article 58(2)b given to the president to dismiss the Assembly. The MMA, the PPPP and the PML-N have all opposed these three clauses. Interestingly, the MMA in its negotiations with the PML-Q has stuck to its position of no National Security Council, giving up of the COAS post by Gen. Musharraf on a specific date which he should announce before being sworn in as president, and is firm that the exercise of presidential powers under 58(2)b should be allowed only after the Senate has cleared such a move.
While Gen. Musharraf may give up the NSC he is unlikely to dilute his powers to dismiss an elected government. He maintains he will move from the khaki to the mufti soon but refuses to announce a date. Clearly there has been some softening of stance by Gen. Musharraf on constitutional amendments; however only as far as the power of the politicians has required him to.
The power game of give and take on Pakistan’s political scenario continues. And the players remain the civilian politicians and the country’s uniformed managers. Developments in the post-election 2002 period will ensure a continued civilian-military partnership in running the government. The responsibility for these developments lies with both the civilian politicians and uniformed men.
