For Israel, the most threatening development the war with Iraq had to offer was the possibility of Scud missiles or chemical weapons being lobbed into the country. Because neither scenario materialized, the most serious concern facing Tel Aviv now is the war’s end. The conclusion of hostilities will switch attention from Iraq back to the Middle East crisis and consequently the upcoming publication of the much-vaunted road map.
Israel has made it clear that it has no interest in the road map. Clear rejection was uttered by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in January, ahead of his country’s general elections. He claimed that the quartet, which drafted the plan and which consists of the US, the European Union, Russia and the UN, “is nothing. Don’t take it seriously. There is another plan that will work.”
The “other plan” was around 100 proposed amendments by the Israeli government. This went down badly in Washington where the preference was to publish the text and only then get into the haggling. The latest reports speak of 15 “reservations” that Sharon intends to convey to the Bush administration.
There is more than one problem with the road map, but the biggest hurdle of them all is Israel’s rejection of it. Some Israeli ministers demand an explicit Palestinian renunciation of the refugees’ right to return, a demand no Palestinian can accept. Above all, the Sharon government insists on a principle of sequence or conditionality that the December draft carefully left vague. First, Israel says, the Palestinian side must curb “the terrorism and stop all incitement.” Only after a lengthy period of quiet would Israel’s duties kick in, including the duty to freeze the building of new settlements. But to those unaware of Israel’s manipulation of the term “terrorism,” it was indirectly suggesting that such a plan would ultimately never be implemented.
The Palestinians do not like the road map much either. They say it has all the defects of Oslo and offers even less. Although the plan is phrased in a way that places certain expectations on both sides, it continuously presses Palestinians to initiate reform as a prerequisite for Israeli action. Palestinians are expected to end “terrorism, violence and incitement.” Only then will Israel freeze settlements. Only Palestinians are expected to implement security and political reforms. The right-wing Israeli government is to do nothing except to withdraw — once Palestinians end the “violence” — to the pre-intifada days. The road map not only failed to emphasize the need to acknowledge international law, and to address key issues such as the right of return, water and occupied Jerusalem, but also failed to even define the borders of a Palestinian state or provide any mechanism or guarantees to secure the implementation of the plan.
Palestinians and Israelis now wait for the road map to be formally presented. Its publication was not as imminent as President Bush first indicated. First it was tied to the results of the Israeli election, then the appointment of a new Palestinian prime minister, then to the moment when he announces his Cabinet and finally to an end to the war in Iraq.
It seems the time for its introduction is approaching, but the Bush administration appears not to have made up its mind about the degree of commitment it has toward the road map — which can be just as detrimental as Israel’s opposition to it.
