What about fundamentalism? It looks as if one consequence of Saddam’s overthrow has been the collapse of a secular Arabic regime. Iraq was a country that outclassed others in the region, even Turkey, in eradicating fundamentalist movements.
The United States, which went so far in fragmenting the Taleban and chasing Al-Qaeda all over the world, has now freed Iraqi fundamentalism, both Shiite and Sunni.
It is equally paradoxical that the same Islamic fundamentalism always supported Saddam’s regime which itself represented concepts that fundamentalism itself denounced and hated.
Opening the door to Shiite fundamentalism in the south or to Sunni fundamentalism in Baghdad or the north will not transform in the near future its role into that of a main political party for various regional and international considerations. One of those considerations of course is that the US, which is paying for the war, will never give a triumph to Islamic fundamentalists who might well be disciples of Khomeini or Bin Laden. Nevertheless, we must expect them to play a major role as a part of the current forces and current events.
What about the impact of the fundamentalism movement in the Middle East generally? Before the war, it was a big concern. We should not forget that this movement and its leaders, ideological and factional, appeased Saddam while invading Kuwait and they lost.
Then they supported Bin Laden, believing that war in Afghanistan would become another Vietnam for America. They lost again. And most recently, they determined to support Saddam but the result was even more disappointing. If the leadership stances are counted as being local, not regional, or anti-Saddam, this will not convince its followers who can foresee big defeats to the proposed promises.
Even Muslims are embarrassed now that the things done under Saddam’s regime are suddenly clear and obvious to the world. However, let us admit that there is a political gap in the region, a gap which normally the fundamentalists try to fill instead of leaving it to others, nationalists for example, or liberal democrats. Kuwait was a worthy cause. After the victory of the Americans in their war against Saddam in Kuwait, they helped the country onto the larger stage of democracy and freedom of expression. The forgotten question, however, is: Who won? The victory benefited fundamentalism and tribalism which prospered in an unprecedented way in the modern history of Kuwait. Certainly, any new regime that gives a certain margin of freedom, in Iraq or the region, will be beneficial to the fundamentalists who are almost the only ones who have a political proposal, devoted followers, and immense financial capabilities. But the possibility of this movement, or rather movements, to climb the ladder of authority is unlikely because of their structures which is exposed to rifts and conflicts. And in common with other movements, it will clash with the reality which requires many concessions that contradict its proposals.
Briefly, if the US is hoping to change the fascist regime in Iraq, or the fundamentalist one in Afghanistan, or propel the region away from extremism, it is unlikely that it will succeed unless it distinguishes between nationalists and extremists, or alienates the religious figures from politics. At the same time, if it fails to curb the extremists, it is imperative to admit that it succeeded in only defeating the party’s symbols.
Arab News Features 20 April 2003
