The rapprochement between India and China was long overdue. The differences between these two regional superpowers needed to be addressed and Premier Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing has achieved a desirable new level of understanding, upon which hopefully both countries can build. However, there was a price to be paid for this outbreak of Sino-Indian amity and that has been the sacrifice of principle. Vajpayee earned the considerable gratitude of his hosts by accepting the Chinese claim to occupied Tibet. This act of realpolitik will have serious consequences for the Tibetan exiles and their country’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, who are currently refugees in India.
New Delhi may well have calculated that other major powers, anxious to win themselves strong positions in the lucrative Chinese market, have gently sidelined the question of Tibetan independence. Why should India impair its own economic and political position by upholding an apparently doomed cause? At the level of self-interest such an analysis is hard to refute. There are however other standards that might well guide a country’s behavior on the world stage. Has there perhaps been a special favor promised to India for giving China a free hand in Tibet? This is an important question. The suspicion must be that Beijing has agreed to abandon its traditional support for Pakistan in its long standoff with India. In the new friendly world of China-Indian relations, there is no room to Chinese tweaking of New Delhi’s nose with troop movements along undecided borders and diplomatic warnings every time a new row breaks out with Islamabad.
A Chinese withdrawal from the Indo-Pakistan political mix will leave a vacuum. As a result of their decision to invade Afghanistan, the Americans exerted immense pressure on the Pakistani government, first to abandon its traditional support for the Taleban and then to cooperate in the military campaign against the Taleban and its Al-Qaeda guests. Widely resented by many ordinary Pakistanis, President Pervez Musharraf had no other choices. Chinese and Russian diplomats looked away, the British government was in Washington’s pocket. If Beijing is indeed withdrawing its supportive presence from Pakistan, then this leaves the government in Islamabad with only the United States as its ally, and not always an entirely desirable ally Washington may prove to be.
In an ideal world, Beijing might have tried to use the leverage of good relations with New Delhi to push for a resolution of the Kashmir question. It would have been an act of international statesmanship that could have won Beijing many admirers. Such an accord would have been an occasion for pride and congratulations for both parties and they would have given themselves a much increased role on the world stage.
