There is something to be said for being a former superpower. Especially if, like Russia, you still have the trappings, like nuclear weaponry and substantial land, sea and air forces.
Foreign policy strategists in the Kremlin no longer need to cover absolutely every international base, as they did in their long Cold War with Washington. There is no knee-jerk reaction to each and every political twist and turn in a continent such as Africa, no necessity to fund and cultivate dubious Marxist insurrections, no requirement to pump out a flow of propaganda. Instead, to a very large degree the Kremlin world-watchers can now pick and choose the issues they focus on. There is thus an increased chance that when Moscow seeks to intervene, it will enjoy success.
Russia’s initiative to bring the renegade North Korean regime into dialogue with the South, along with Japan and China and the United States, has started off well. The North Koreans had originally insisted that they would speak only directly to Washington, which for its part was little interested in being hectored by the unstable Pyongyang leadership. The Americans asked the Chinese to help, but Beijing seems to have made little headway with the regime it once shed oceans of its own soldiers’ blood to defend. Japan for its part still carries the stigmatic baggage of its pre-war ruthless occupation and exploitation of the Korean Peninsula.
But Moscow was different. A strong supporter from Soviet days, the Kremlin contrived to maintain friendly relations, even when Russia itself abandoned command economics and launched itself into the free market. Thus the Pyongyang regime has grasped the opportunity for six-part talks in Moscow. They represent the best chance of defusing the confrontation between the US and North Korea. President George W. Bush and his foreign policy advisers would do well to appreciate this. They should do nothing to wreck the talks. If President Vladimir Putin does indeed pull off a diplomatic coup, his American opposite number should welcome it generously and gratefully. Washington does not need a military stand-off with North Korea. It is already under considerable pressure in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Unalloyed support for Russian intervention with North Korea, whatever its ultimate success, will also serve a further use. Russia needs some wins to restore its pride, dented by the collapse of its old ways and by failures like the Chechen assault and the loss of the submarine Kursk. A sullenly ineffectual Russia is not good for world peace. Washington must therefore do all it can to support this important chance for a breakthrough with North Korea, and, should the initiative fail, let the Kremlin down lightly. We need a Russia that feels good about itself and continues to be prepared to engage ever more deeply with the rest of the world.
