YOKOSUKA, Japan, 17 August 2003 — It is unfortunate that North Korea’s proposal for a “non-aggression pact’’ with the United States appears to be gaining support among some prominent US policymakers and other influential figures. Such a pact would in fact lead only to a withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and perhaps even to Japan’s justifying the development of its own nuclear weapons.
North Korea believes its national security has been seriously threatened by a series of President Bush’s remarks and acts, including his “Axis of Evil’’ speech in January 2002, which included North Korea as one of the evils, and his war against Saddam Hussein. North Korean leaders believe Bush is aiming for “regime change’’ in Pyongyang. Therefore, from the viewpoint of their leader, Kim Jong Il, North Korea needs nuclear weapons to dissuade Washington from attacking. As an alternative, Kim would accept a non-aggression pact with the United States to guarantee his regime’s security.
But by deliberately protracting negotiations concerning the format of multilateral talks, North Korea has actually been buying time to develop its nuclear weapons further. Indeed, Pyongyang’s agreement to the multilateral talks involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia offers little reason for optimism. Pyongyang can find many excuses for stalling the talks and continuing to work on its nuclear weapons.
The principal condition for the negotiations that North Korea will try to impose on the United States is the proposed non-aggression pact with Washington. In the past North Korea has demanded such an agreement in return for its renouncing its nuclear weapons program and permitting full inspections of its nuclear facilities. But this is a dangerous offer that could eventually backfire on the United States. Washington should not sign a pact stating it has no intention of launching a nuclear attack on North Korea. A non-aggression pact would be extremely risky. First, how would the signatories ensure that the on-site inspections of suspected facilities were complete and that North Korea had in fact abandoned its nuclear arms programs?
Second, once a non-aggression pact was signed, Pyongyang might demand the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, arguing that an American presence on the Korean Peninsula was no longer needed. The South Korean public likely would support North Korea’s demand.
Third, if American troops left South Korea, Pyongyang would appeal to its South Korean “brothers’’ to call for a united Korea without a US role. In addition, some Japanese would probably argue that American bases in Okinawa ought to be downgraded or closed. Finally, and most important, a non-aggression pact would conflict with the Japan-US Security Treaty. A North Korea without nuclear weapons would still possess biological and chemical weapons and could use them to attack Japan. In such an event, US forces in Japan could not help defend Japan in accordance with their bilateral treaty, since the United States would have promised not to attack North Korea. Tokyo could no longer rely on its alliance with Washington and might decide to develop its own retaliatory nuclear weapons.
Instead of a non-aggression pact, the United States, together with Japan and South Korea, should offer diplomatic recognition to Pyongyang. Bilateral and multilateral talks involving North Korea have already demonstrated the de facto recognition of that country by the three countries. If it were made official, the three countries could open embassies in Pyongyang, which would then be better able to observe the country and to continue communicating with the government.
In the meantime, the United States and Japan should target non-military sanctions at the North Korean leaders to convince them that their tactics of buying time are not paying off. Such sanctions should include measures to detect and shelve the trade of technologies and weapons of mass destruction, as well as to retard the trade of illicit drugs and counterfeit currencies. This can be done through the close observation and possible interdiction of North Korean ships on the high seas.
Last month, using the excuse of stricter safety regulations, Japan succeeded in temporarily shutting down the visit to Japan of a North Korean ferry that allegedly was being used as a spy ship and for the illegal purchases of technologies. This was a good first step in the right direction.
— Masashi Nishihara is president of Japan’s National Defense Academy.
