DUBAI, 5 October 2003 — On the surface, the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Germany is so limited that it reflects neither the geographic proximity nor the vital links that exist in several fields between the two sides. A closer look, however, reveals the existence of a “traditional friendship”. While this perception is a chance for fruitful political, economic, security and cultural cooperation on the one hand, it arouses high expectations and demands on the other.
It is true that the scope for German policy in the region is limited — the US is the dominant power, economically, politically and militarily. This, in turn, has had a special impact on the German policy in the Gulf, especially since the US perceived Iran and Iraq as “hostile” countries.
Further, if the association has not achieved the recognition that it deserves, it is also partly due to the high expectations that the region has of Germany as an international player. Bilateral relations in the aftermath of World War II and Germany’s stance toward the Arab-Israeli conflict were influenced by its antithetic ties with the Arab states on the one side and Israel on the other. Since Germany has had no colonial past in the region, Arab countries expect it to play a strong role within the European Union (EU) and support their interests, especially in finding a solution to the Palestinian question.
In this context, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s visit to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) should be viewed as a concerted effort to intensify German engagement in the Gulf region as part of an attempt to redefine its foreign policy in the wake of Sept. 11, 2001.
From “unlimited solidarity” in lending support to US President George W. Bush’s “war against terror” after 9/11 to an emphatic “no” to joining the US-led forces against Iraq in 2003, Germany’s diplomatic transition has come full circle. This approach — contrary to the US way of forcing a “regime change” by imposing sanctions and launching pre-emptive strikes — has gelled well with the regional stance.
This new approach is founded on Germany’s respect for international law and justice. Accordingly, the basis of German foreign policy hinges on the belief in “critical dialogue” — emphasis on engagement over confrontation as a means to evolve solutions to problems in international politics — that has manifested in the attempt to tide over the crisis involving Iran.
The change is a result of the realization on the part of the EU that formulated a collective policy on the Middle East, which Germany initiated. The most crucial reason for the change, however, was the high number of asylum-seekers in the country. Since 1960, nearly four million people — mostly Muslims — have migrated to Germany. Ensuring stability in the Middle East through proactive engagement was seen as a key to ward off both migration and domestic Muslim discontent.
Schroeder’s tour to the region assumes greater significance because GCC-German relations transcend the realm of oil, which is often the most obvious factor in any association with the Gulf countries. Although oil is the most important import item from the GCC countries to Germany, the Gulf is not its chief crude supplier — Russia, Norway, Britain, Libya and Kazakhstan rank way above Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, the importance of Germany for the GCC countries still lies in the economic sector. Pushed by the Cooperation Agreement signed between the GCC and the EU in 1989, trade ties have been growing steadily, having a positive impact on political cooperation.
Among Germany’s foreign trade partners in 2001, Saudi Arabia was ranked 48th and the UAE 83rd on the imports list that mainly consisted of motor vehicles and heavy machinery, and 35th and 37th respectively in the sphere of exports, chiefly petroleum, gas and chemical products.
A comparison of the trade relations of all the GCC countries with Germany in 2001 indicates that Saudi Arabia’s share of exports to Germany was 77.6 percent and that of the UAE, 15.7 percent. With regard to the proportion of imports, Saudi Arabia was the most important recipient with a share of 40.5 percent, closely followed by the UAE with 38.9 percent.
In 2002, the total German exports to the UAE were worth about $3.1 billion and to Saudi Arabia about $3.5 billion. In the first half of 2003, German exports to both the countries appear to be equal at approximately $1.5 billion.
The fact that the Gulf countries have a regional organization — one that guarantees freedom of movement, residence and establishment among its members and has recently set up a Customs Union, which makes it a natural partner for Germany and the EU — is yet another area of mutual interest.
Apart from Germany’s experience as a member of the EU aiding in the evolution of the regional bloc as an institution, it can support the path of development chosen by the GCC countries through intensive cooperation in the fields of economic diversification, investment, transfer of technology and education.
The GCC countries are also striving to maintain a free trade environment and are progressively eliminating remaining limitations originally intended to protect domestic investors. With the exception of Saudi Arabia — which is expected to gain membership soon — they are already members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Furthermore, the GCC has the most developed financial markets in the Arab world owing to the oil wealth in the region, the free convertibility and stability of the currencies and the relative openness of the economies to international trade. They are also keen to integrate into the emerging system of global governance, and to adapt their policies to the best international practices, within the limits imposed by some special cultural traits.
The proposed EU-GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would, in parallel with the possible WTO accession of Saudi-Arabia, open the GCC countries to international competition and communication, eventually promoting economic reform and social change. Effective cooperation will thus become a part of a broader project aimed at making the GCC countries a part of the global economy.
The prospect of international investment in the GCC economies will also contribute to an improved business climate. Taking into account that the FTA process has been linked to the WTO framework, Germany could actively support Saudi Arabia’s accession to the trade forum by finding a swift solution to the outstanding problems that are hindering negotiations.
Beyond economic cooperation, the GCC countries and Germany attach a high degree of importance to collaboration on security issues. It is a mutually understood concept that security and stability in the region can only be assured through the teamwork of all the actors in a framework that defines principles to ensure the maintenance of peace in the region and instruments for the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts.
Although there is no agreed international definition of terrorism, this should not inhibit dialogue on a pragmatic basis. There must be scope for agreement on controlling financial flow to groups recognized by both sides as terror-prone and on the common threat which terrorism poses.
Iran is another crucial area for GCC-German cooperation. A politically stable Iran is vital for the stability and security of the whole Gulf region.
Though the German-Iranian relations are not free of conflicts, Germany has had traditional ties with Iran, which it maintained even after the Islamic revolution and contributed to the implementation of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in 1988. That partnership has intensified after President Mohammed Khatami assumed office in 1997.
As part of the “critical dialogue” framework, Germany is now taking a lead role in the attempt to reintegrate Iran into the international community through comprehensive communication that covers global, regional and mutual cooperation. Realizing the importance of avoiding another Iraq-like situation in the region, Germany, both individually and collectively as part of EU, has sought to take a proactive role to tide over the Iran-US deadlock. Berlin has offered inducements to Tehran if it stops the disputed nuclear fuel enrichment program and has urged it to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s “Additional Protocol” that provides for intrusive, short-notice inspections.
There is no doubt that the international community is split into two — one favoring a unilateral world order and another wanting a multilateral system. The solution to this vexed issue is of essential interest to the region, Germany and the EU. If a unilateral order prevails, the EU will get even weaker, adversely affecting the region. A consolidated Germany-EU-GCC approach, however, could help turn the tide.
— Abdulaziz Sager is chairman of the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. ([email protected])
