CAMBRIDGE, Mass., 6 December 2003 — It’s a December with a difference. If in 2001 the subcontinent was on the brink of war, in 2003, it’s hard to keep count of the peace offerings. Gen. Musharraf wants to nominate Prime Minister Vajpayee for Nishan-e-Pakistan if he can help resolve the Kashmir dispute. The hope in Islamabad is to get India to the negotiating table.
In the region this is being received with guarded optimism. Roller-coaster situations are all too common in Pakistan-India relations. Yet the atmosphere for starting dialogue in the wake of the Agra summit is now more auspicious than ever.
Pakistan’s establishment appears to have opted for a pro-active India policy, beginning with the prime minister’s Eid speech in which he called for a cease-fire.
Indian post-December 2001 policy of military brinkmanship toward Pakistan has now been matched by Pakistan’s political brinkmanship. Musharraf’s own “front-foot play” in trying to engage India in a dialogue over Kashmir and other bilateral issues, Washington’s advice, the Kashmiri opinion and the failure of a reactive policy toward India have all contributed to this changed Pakistani approach.
The Musharraf government hopes that Pakistan and the Kashmiris may gain from such a policy. Clearly Pakistan stands to lose nothing. It wants India to agree to the resumption of bilateral dialogue on Kashmir. Without it, sustainable peace is impossible.
Prime Minister Vajpayee personally dictates India’s Pakistan policy; and he has looked to Pakistan for any positive signals which he could seize on to stretch the limitations that political compulsions dictate.
He has responded to Pakistan’s recent initiatives by saying he will meet all the Pakistani leaders when he visits Pakistan. Vajpayee understands that without Pakistan there can be no lasting solution of the Kashmir dispute. While India announced in October that it has ICBMs in place, Vajpayee understands their limited utility. They are no substitute for a sustained dialogue.
While Pakistan must keep up its proactive normalization policy toward India, the onus of converting it into sustainable peace rests squarely on India’s shoulders.
India will have to re-visit its policy. At the moment it is saying that it will not talk about the substantive issues outlined jointly at the Agra summit and in the Lahore Declaration unless there is “a complete end to cross-border terrorism,” and it is also saying that increased US pressure on Pakistan rather than bilateral talks will help to ease the Kashmir pressure on India.
But by force of circumstances, New Delhi has been forced to veer a little from this policy. Bilateral talks over the controversial issue of the Baghliar Dam have taken place. Also, during the twelfth SAARC in Pakistan, Vajpayee will be obliged to meet the head of state and the prime minister of his host country. Going beyond the Foreign Ministry’s brief, India’s seasoned prime minister must use this opportunity to prepare the grounds for bilateral talks soon after the SAARC summit. Vajpayee, aided by his trusted National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and former RAW chief A.S. Daulat, has after all opted for a hands-on approach in conducting India’s Pakistan and Kashmir policies.
In India the skeptics write off the LOC cease-fire as insubstantive and claim that the snow-bound mountains making crossings difficult: It is only the summer months that will show how serious Pakistan is about it. True. Yet how early India engages with Pakistan on substantive issues will greatly affect Pakistani resolve. The cease-fire is not likely to be sustained if there is zero movement on the Kashmir dispute.
Meanwhile Pakistan must stay the course on its current India policy, which Islamabad believes may promote the interests of peace without compromising either Kashmiri interests or Pakistan’s own strategic interests. Pakistan must see peace-building as a process; results will not be instantaneous. In Gen. Musharraf’s own words “we ought to work with great tolerance, responsibility and sincerity in order to carry these talks ahead.”
Ultimately, bilateral dynamics and ground realities — not Washington, Beijing or Moscow — will determine the fate of sustainable peace in South Asia. If the subcontinent’s nuclear reality rules out the possibility of war between the two neighbors, the reality of a resistance movement of alienated Kashmiris rules out any “sell-out” on Kashmir. The logic of the Kashmir dispute, in other words, dictates that a political settlement must be found — one that is acceptable to all parties. None of the three parties can go it alone. This realization alone will take India and Pakistan back to the negotiating table. Intent will define policy content. If the steps from Islamabad and New Delhi were prompted by point-scoring or attempts to deflect pressure, this phase of normalization may not carry the two toward essential dialogue. In that case tactical advances will inevitably be overshadowed by strategic retreats.
Both countries therefore need to return to the unsigned Agra Declaration, affirming “their commitment to addressing each other’s expressed concerns and creating an environment conducive to the establishment of peaceful, friendly and cooperative ties, for the welfare of the people of the two countries.”
