Afghanistan’s three-week-long grand assembly or Loya Jirga has ended with an overwhelming endorsement for a new constitution. On paper at least, the last act of the Bonn Peace accord of 2001 has been completed. Yet already some observers are predicting that this fragile deal is doomed. But before accepting such a gloomy analysis, we must consider what Afghan leaders have achieved and what must now be done to help Afghanistan.
Regional leaders, including Pushtuns, Uzbeks and Tajiks, whose past rivalries weakened the Afghan state, have sat down and talked. Sure, tempers were lost. Probably no one achieved everything that he wanted. But compromise is the essence of negotiation. The decisions made in Kabul were made peaceably. There were no armed groups hovering in the wings.
It is doubtful that everything will go smoothly from now on. Yet the fact remains that for the first time in 40 years nearly all of the interests that make up the rich cultural and historic mosaic of Afghanistan met and talked, long and hard. Negotiation is about achieving the possible. If there are limitations to the present constitution, they arise because there are still suspicions and reservations, which only time can overcome. It is better that this first constitutional document is realistic rather than an airy piece of political wishful thinking, doomed to fail its first test. There will be setbacks. But what has been created is a constitutional framework around which all sides can work and to which they can return if things go wrong. The only people who were not party to the constitutional agreement were the Taleban, who continue to hold out in the east of the country. Probably responsible for yesterday’s devastating Kandahar bomb blast, they were never interested in compromise. But the time may come when even their remnants will see the virtue of signing up to an agreement which could at last bring security and peace to this damaged land.
Now that the constitution is in place, it is crucial that the international community delivers on those brave promises of aid and funds that flowed after the Bonn talks three years ago. There are of course severe security problems in Afghanistan, but they are nothing compared to those faced by the occupation forces in Iraq. Yet the campaign to rebuild Iraq is in full swing. Why is the same thing not happening in Afghanistan? Why are development funds not pouring into the country? Why are poor Afghan farmers returning to their traditional opium growing when they should be receiving help to grow and market proper crops?
The world must not turn its back on the Afghans now that the Taleban and Al-Qaeda have gone. The success of the Loya Jirga must be reinforced by substantial international support, to allow these promising but delicate seeds of peace and stability to grow.
