JEDDAH, 14 March 2004 — Is the President of the United States free to define his country’s national interests overseas and draw up strategies in dealing with global issues? Why do you hear voices, which say that there is little difference between foreign policy statements uttered by President George Bush and Democrat presidential candidate John Kerry?
Who in the United States defines national interests vis-à-vis foreign countries or regions? Who perceives America’s global interests abroad and translates them into objectives? Who designs strategies and plans of action to achieve them? Is it the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA, the research centers/institutes? Or is it the board of directors of the multinationals? As a matter of fact all of the above participate and/or contribute. The Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA and other agencies are then entrusted with carrying out their respective assignments and executing the strategy. In other words, institutions, not individuals, no matter how high ranking they may be, define US national interests.
Does this mean that in ordinary circumstances the president of the United States has only a small margin in which to maneuver?
The margin is limited to the means to be used and style of executing the respective strategy. The substance of the strategy remains largely unchanged. This explains why the two competing candidates in the current race for the White House sound almost identical in describing the issues. But they do clearly differ in the promises they make and language they use to describe the manner in which they plan to execute the strategies.
Bush promises to continue to lead his country by insisting on his unilateralist approach and the use of pre-emptive strikes. Kerry, on the other hand, promises to bridge the gap with America’s European and other allies and work with the international community in dealing with global issues. We should only recall Bill Clinton’s handling of the North Korean issue, Afghanistan, the Middle East and Iraq. He sought the same objectives but pursued them using different means and style. Even within the same party, individual styles distinguish individual presidents. In respect of the ultimate effect on foreign policy these differences remain relatively small, as they are largely personality-related. Before the dramatic events of Sept. 11 G. W. Bush’s performance in foreign relations resembled, more or less, his father’s. The most that we can hope for in case the Democrats take over the White House in November is a change of means employed and style.
However, major events, such as those of the Sept. 11, could give rise to major strategy changes even within the life of the same presidency. The events of Sept. 11 induced fundamental changes especially in dealing with the Middle East. The ultimate objective, i.e. the US control of the region and its resources remained the same. But the manner in which Washington perceived its role in the region and its strategy has been dramatically altered. It had been one of cooperation with and support of the “friendly” moderate states in the region. With the less cooperative governments it consisted of varying degrees of pressure. Even when confrontation was deemed necessary, such as the case with Iraq, Afghanistan (before the two wars), with Iran, Libya, Syria, and Korea, it was used with carefully measured magnitudes designed to show seriousness and to restore and/or enforce respect for certain “red lines”.
No matter what camouflage is used to justify the new belligerence in US policy in dealing with the Middle East, we should never lose sight of the real reasons, which underlie this change of strategy.
Ever since the Middle East war of 1973, dependence on Gulf oil has irked the US and some other industrial nations. Since then no effort or expense have been spared to locate and develop alternative sources of oil. Some real discovery is yet to materialize. Similarly, energy substitutes, in spite of great efforts, also have not materialized.
The oil producing countries gradually but amicably had taken possession of the oil industry in their territories. Contrary to Western fears oil countries in the region have maintained rationality and a great sense of responsibility in developing their oil industries and insured against interruption of supply of oil to the world They also exhibited, under OPEC, a spirit of cooperation in an orchestrated pricing policy designed to safeguard growth and prosperity of global economies. The neoconservatives in Washington, in line with their ambition to achieve global control, appear to have seen in Sept. 11 a unique opportunity to move back the clock. Would they be aspiring to retake the oil industry of the region and, if successful, bring oil prices further down and rechannel profits to the multinational oil companies? Most of these are largely under American control.
Whatever it is the neoconservatives are trying to do, it smacks of arrogance and greed. But the euphoria in which the neoconservatives are living may turn to be a nightmare. They keep forgetting that people of the region are people of the 21st century, not those of the 19th century or those of the post-World War I. The neoconservatives of Washington could not and should not aspire to re-enact the colonial drama, which Britain played in those ugly episodes of human history. It is no longer possible, in fact naïve, for any power on earth to try to subdue people of the region and dream of retaking control of their resources. The cost saving or gain, which the neoconservatives of Washington may be aspiring to, could prove futile and self-defeating. There is no alternative to the partnership approach, which should prevail in dealing with the region. There may be less gain, but that should be preferable to greater loss.
— Hani Emam is a Saudi businessman based in Jeddah.
