PARIS, 24 March 2004 — As they prepare for their summit, scheduled to take place in Tunis at the end of the month, Arab leaders are looking for a common position on the so-called “Greater Middle East Initiative” launched by US President George W Bush last year.
The “initiative” is based on two assumptions. First: The status quo in the “Greater Middle East”, which is redefined to cover the so-called “arc of crisis” from Mauritania to the Subcontinent, is both unstable and dangerous. Second: In the absence of democracy and human rights, many countries of the area act as “swamps” where terrorist mosquitoes breed and multiply.
The solution that the “initiative” proposes is speedy democratization to produce elected new governments that can join the US and its allies in what Bush has labeled “war on terror.” In other words the democratization of the Middle East is no longer an ideological luxury for the Western powers but an imperative of their national security.
But how is all that received by the Arab leadership elite?
Until the 1990 and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire, Arab leftist intellectuals regarded democracy as a “bourgeois concoction.” The Arab secular right, including nationalist and conservative Islamist groups, was also opposed to democratization which it regarded as a tool in the hands of Western “cosmopolitans.”
The more radical Islamist groups were even more hostile to democracy which, in the words of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, was nothing but “a form of political prostitution.”
Now, all that is in the past, however. Today there are few prominent Arab, and other Muslim, opinion-makers who publicly reject democracy as undesirable. And, yet, the Bush “initiative” is certain to hit a wall of misunderstanding and resistance even among those Arabs, and other Muslims, who realize that change is not only inevitable but also desirable.
There are two reasons for this.
The first is that, rightly or wrongly, the US is regarded as insincere in its advocacy of democratization. The Bush “initiative” is seen as a rhetorical device used to confuse people about a long-standing policy of support for unelected, and often oppressive, regimes. The second reason is in trouble with many Arabs, and other Muslims, is hurt amour-propre. Arabs, and other Muslims, resent attempts at altering the basic structures of their societies in accordance with a blueprint imposed by Washington.
All these views are bound to be aired at the Tunis summit which is likely to come up with a “yes, but” answer to the Bush “initiative”. The answer will then be taken to the White House by a string of Arab leaders who are scheduled to meet President Bush next month.
The first argument used by some Arab leaders against the “initiative” is that its hasty implementation could produce the opposite of the desired result. Any truly free election in the immediate future could produce radical Islamist governments dedicated to a war of civilizations against the West.
That assessment must not be dismissed as an excuse to postpone democratization. In most Arab countries virtually all secular opposition forces, from the traditional left to the liberal right, have been broken by decades of repression by the ruling elite. In many cases the ruling elite has encouraged Islamist radicalism as a means of wakening leftist, moderate and democratic forces.
In many Arab countries the Islamists represent the only organized force on the scene. They control many mosques, numerous charities, networks of religious schools, and business endowments that generate vast sums of money. Their true opponents, the secular intellectuals and middle classes, are either in gaol or in exile or remain disorganized and harassed by the security services. The only immediate choice that the electorate would have is between the established order, which is from popular, and the Islamists who promise both this world and the next.
That argument, however, must not be used as an excuse for shelving democratization. Rather it should help devise a strategy to create a level playing field in which genuinely democratic forces can take on both the established order and the radical Islamists in the context of free ad fair elections. In some Arab countries such a level playing field can be created within months. In others it may take years. Change through free and fair elections should be introduced in phases that vary from one country to another.
The second argument that the Arabs are likely to come up with is that aspects of democracy might be at variance with, if not actually in violation of, Arab and Islamic traditions. That argument must be dismissed at the outset. Traditions could no longer be regarded as sufficient ground for rejecting values and practices adopted by a majority of mankind as the norm.
For example, there was a time when cannibalism was part of the “tradition” in many societies across the globe. (In Papua-New Guinea it was still widespread until the 1950s.) Until the middle of the 19th century and since time immemorial slavery was part of the tradition in almost all cultures. And many civilizations, including such great ones as ancient Egypt and ancient Persia, upheld incest as a religious duty of the ruling classes. In Africa today female genital mutilation is regarded as “part of the tradition”.
In any dialogue between the Western democracies and the Arabs the two sides must respect each other’s traditions and values insofar as these do not violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a set of imperatives agreed by both sides.
Anyone who might argue that Arabs and Muslims do not wish to be in control of their own affairs must be laughed out of any dialogue. Arabs, and other Muslims, would love to have a say in shaping the policies of their governments, if only they were given a chance. Silencing, imprisoning, exiling, and murdering political opponents cannot be justified with reference to any tradition.
The coming Arab “yes, but” must not be dismissed by the West. The Arabs must be helped to chart their own way to democratization. This could be done only if the West answers the Arab “yes, but” with a “yes, but” of its own.
This one would be simple: Yes, we understand that you cannot plunge into the uncertain waters of democracy with no preparation, and we are ready to help. But we cannot allow that lack of preparation to be used as an excuse for prolonging a regime under which the people are excluded from decision-making.
