ISLAMABAD, 10 July 2004 — Pakistan’s current power structure, composition of parliamentary parties and the broader political landscape all indicate that the Parliament will complete its five-year tenure. With or without uniform, the general-president leading the re-engineering of Pakistan’s institutions and politics will also retain his hold on the levers of power till, at least, the end of his presidential term. Internal security threats notwithstanding the Musharraf-led transition of Pakistan from a “soft” blundering state with its mostly rotten politicking toward a more effective one will continue.
Meandering forward in these difficult — yet paradoxically also supportive — global conditions, Musharraf has injected life into many parts of the Pakistani state, its politics and society. Advised by mostly his trusted army and a few civilian aides, he went ahead with the devolution system, media freedom, licensing of private television channels, increasing representation of women in the provincial and national parliaments, continued autonomy to the State Bank, and a range of other measures, most of them provoking fierce controversy.
Almost five years into power Musharraf’s scorecard looks good on determination, goals and personal commitment. Overall the strategic course correction that he believes Pakistan needs to embark on cannot be contested. Yet Musharraf’s five years in power have raised many valid questions, particularly about the popular and necessary seven-point agenda he articulated.
While achieving intangibles like national confidence and cohesion is a continuing process, Pakistan’s current foreign and economic policies will help build national confidence in the difficult post-Sept. 11 international environment. Also there has been significant, although not sufficient, progress in the economy and devolution.
Progress on the depoliticizing of state institutions, speedy dispensing of justice and accountability has been minimal. Especially in neutralizing his political opponents by building up a pro-Musharraf political landscape the general-president greatly compromised on elements in his seven-point agenda.
Significantly, with Shaukat Aziz’s installation as prime minister against the backdrop of a supportive Parliament majority, Musharraf will now have the political and legal space to pursue the agenda of establishing a credible judicial system capable of dispensing justice, an honest and competent police system, an independent Election Commission and non-politicized federal and provincial public service commissions. Manipulation of the judiciary, the accountability process and the judicial system must end.
The present Shujaat premiership will smoothly flow into the Shaukat Aziz’s premiership. Aziz’s guaranteed premiership, the support establishment’s support, his “clean” past and to some extent his performance as finance minister promise his victory. After Aziz takes over at the end of August, Pakistanis will experience the Musharraf-Aziz style of national management. The question will be whether it will prove more than the minimum improvement in management of national affairs necessary to plod along or will that spell an era of genuine reform?
The team will have the opportunity to opt for an irreversible reform process. Musharraf has to go beyond the Ayub vision to put Pakistan on an irreversible path of genuine progress.
This will include implementation of genuine political, legal and administrative reforms. The two essentials of that reform process will be balancing between patronage politics and good governance as the president oversees the formation of what he maintains will be a truly democratic Pakistan Muslim League.
The country’s executive, presidency and the administrative machinery will come under severe pressure as Musharraf and PML President Chaudary Shujaat will work on grooming Aziz while other pro-Musharraf and opposition parties will also seek to expand their respective political basis.
The second significant essential will be withdrawing the army from the civilian sector. Hundreds of military officers heading many state institutions need to return to the barracks, and only a military man can ensure that they do so. Civilians need to be returned their constitutional turf of governance.
(Nasim Zehra is an Islamabad-based security analyst and fellow of the Harvard University Asia Center.)
