The failure to find any WMD following the Iraqi invasion prompted widespread outrage in countries that opposed the war, and deep embarrassment in those who supported it. This led to the formation of various committees to investigate the spirit and integrity of pre-war intelligence. Recently these commissions disclosed their findings and it has been scandalous, to say the least, to analyze their worthy pronouncements. The US Senate committee concluded that the intelligence was “fragmentary” and “inconclusive”, while the British Butler report described it as “seriously flawed” and their Australian counterparts viewed it as “thin”, “ambiguous” and “incomplete”. Therefore, at face value, it would be simpler to concur with their impressions and accept that the intelligence was innocently lacking and unwittingly flawed. However, there is another less savory possibility. This envisages that the provisional assessment of the intelligence agencies was hijacked to tailor the needs of the political expediency.
Unfortunately, as studied history testifies, intelligence accumulation is not a mathematical science that lends to perfect answers by simple additions. It is the painstaking job of connecting incongruent dots and analyzing the commonly lopsided end picture. It has no strident hues of black and white but varying shades of gray that in turn may be defined by its luminous bearer. This offers the random opportunity to misconstrue data and mislabel facts, something that the intelligence agencies of America and Britain seem to be guilty of.
Of all the recent conflicts waged across the globe, the war in Iraq was perhaps the only one which resulted from a different guiding principle altogether. Wherein previously wars were sanctioned in the civilized world as unwanted last-resort measures, in the post-Sept. 11 era, pre-emptive use of force has become the virtual imperative of self-defense. And for any measure of pre-emption or war posturing to be justified, background intelligence work in assessing the threat is of paramount importance. Such was the publicized case in Iraq, in which US President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair cited their country’s covert intelligence to spell out the “imminent: danger to the world at large.
In the period before March 2003, there were three basic justifications cited by the “coalition of the willing” in launching the war against Iraq. Amongst these, WMD and the terrorist threat were perhaps the most prominent. The question that was asked then was whether Iraq posed a clear and present danger to the stability and peace of the world. That question now seems to have been retrospectively answered by the investigative committees of US and Britain alike with a resounding “no”. The question that is asked today is this: Did the espionage analysts of these countries, under the relentless pressure of their political masters, generate the incriminating dirt against the Iraqi regime?
To understand this, one has to look at the pattern of premeditation that evolved from these countries in the lead-up to the war. One recalls that the decision to go to war had been taken by the Bush administration even before the UN weapons inspectors had reported back to the Security Council. Recently, Richard Clarke, the former American counterterrorism chief revealed that President Bush had indicated to him as far back as September 2001 that Iraq was in his gun sights after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. A year later, the British and American governments had already made their case for war to the world community by presenting their respective “dossiers”. During this period, a regular stream of senior administrative officials in both the American and British ruling hierarchy continued to aim unhinged accusations at the Iraqi regime. For instance, statements by leaders of both America and Britain relating to a covert uranium purchase request by Iraq were allowed to proliferate despite the fact that the CIA already had information to the contrary. For those watching from the sidelines, in the build-up to the war there seemed to be an overwillingness by the “coalition of the willing” to unabashedly propagate the doomsday scenario.
In this scheme of events, one can but only conjecture the quandary of the CIA and the MI6 which were given the task of preparing the case for war. Their predicament likely focused between either labeling their information as pre-eminent suspicion or to join the ever-fragmented and inconclusive dots and make a “slam-dunk” case for going to war. Sadly, any attempt at dissent was brushed aside under the banner of patriotic brinkmanship and consequently became the first casualty of war.
By making its desire known, the political establishment was presenting the intelligence services with a fait accompli and in the process coercing them to substantiate their fiery allegations. The CIA had already been reeling under a furor of criticism for having failed to avert the Sept. 11 attacks. Its intelligence was hence, not incoherent and flawed as the Senate committee has concluded but rather, spiced with the malicious intent of proving the theory of its government correct. And on its part, the political administration likely released its pre-war statements with the express intent of evoking the desired analytical response from the intelligence agencies.
When on every detail of intelligence, facts have now proved the theories wrong then one is tempted to reflect on a darker possibility that pre-war intelligence was deliberately and knowingly misinterpreted. Claims of overstating the facts have previously emanated from high-ranking arms experts like David Kelly of Britain. However, for politicians to knowingly massage the intelligence or to modify its inference would be suicidal.
On the other hand, we are clearly aware that there has been a politicization of the intelligence collection and its analytical process under the Bush administration. Although the investigating commissions have universally vindicated their respective office holders of any wrongdoing, the complexity of such affairs dictates that such conclusions by any board would err by oversimplification. The intelligence agencies have been made mere scapegoats, while it is the folly of poor statesmanship that should bear actual responsibility. Perforce, we return to the only viable option whereby the intelligence agencies and the political establishment fed off each other’s expectations into a spiraling abyss of political recklessness that sadly led to this avoidable war.
When nations go to war, they should be answerable to the world community at large. And when war is waged despite the unambiguous dissension of the majority of the UN; and despite the scores of peace rallies in every corner of the world, then there must be something fundamentally wrong with world politics. The “coalition of the willing” was an alliance of the minority. The Iraqi war was an illegal war when it was waged — today it has also become an unjustified war. A message of accountability then, needs to be sent to the ruling elite in every corner of the world. And that uncorrupted message should emanate from the voters of America and Britain in their upcoming elections.
— Dr. Faisal Sanai is a Saudi physician working at the Armed Forces Hospital in Riyadh.
