Kofi Annan’s declaration that the US and British attack on Iraq was illegal will renew the pressure on Tony Blair over the war. The prime minister’s claim that he went to war partly to defend the United Nations’ authority in the face of Saddam Hussein’s non-compliance with Security Council resolutions now lies in tatters — along with his other justifications.
When the UN secretary-general himself says that it was Washington and London who were not complying with international law, Bush and Blair should now clearly acknowledge they did wrong.
But it is not just the launch of the war which was illegal. Illegality continues today. Take the US helicopter attack on a crowd in Haifa Street, Baghdad, last Sunday, which killed 13 people and injured dozens (including a Guardian reporter). It was almost certainly a war crime.
The pilots’ unarmed victims came into the street after insurgents had destroyed an American Bradley fighting vehicle, a cross between a tank and an armored personnel carrier. The soldiers inside it were quickly rescued by comrades and withdrew. By the time the jubilant crowd gathered to gawp at the Bradley’s smoldering remains, military activity had ceased.
Why then did the pilots shoot? The official version is that ground fire was being aimed at them. Even if true, questions remain. Why didn’t the helicopters fly off to safety? Fire need not be answered, if there is a more sensible way of avoiding being hit, especially when the ground troops the helicopters were supposedly protecting had already left the scene. Secondly, did the pilots properly assess the risk to civilians from a disproportionate response? From the casualties caused, the evidence strongly suggests they did not.
The assumption has to be that the pilots’ motive was revenge. If so, the incident would not be unique. In case after case, the behavior of US forces in Iraq appears to be degenerating into vindictive killing, decided not only at the tactical but also at command level.
Lt. Gen. James Conway, who commanded US Marines at Fallujah in April, recently revealed he was unhappy with a higher-ranking decision to assault the town after four American contractors were killed and their bodies mutilated. He was against “attacking out of revenge”, he now says.
His description of the offensive’s primary purpose is surely right, although — as with the Haifa Street massacre — no war crimes trial is likely. Belatedly, and usually only after media exposure, abuses in US— and UK-run military prisons in Iraq have led to court proceedings. The bigger issue of crimes against civilians perpetrated in the air above Iraqi cities and from tanks and other vehicles is still taboo.
Armies which resort to revenge are usually ones that are losing. Within the Sunni region, Ramadi, Fallujah and Samarra have become no-go areas. The same is true of the Shiite holy cities of Kerbala and Najaf. It is not that US forces are impotent. With their overwhelming fire power they are unbeatable. What is changing is the growth of resistance, both military and political, and the ebbing-away of US legitimacy. Increasing numbers of influential Iraqis tell US commanders to keep out of populated areas and withdraw to barracks, as Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani did most notably in Najaf.
The US Army’s excessive use of force is a key factor. But there is also a growing sense among Iraqis that the occupation is causing more problems than it is solving. Polls have shown for several months that the number of Iraqis who say they would feel safer if foreign troops left immediately exceeds the number who would feel less safe. They want Iraqi security forces to take over.
After comprehensive analysis of the main polls, plus its own interviews with individuals and focus groups, the center-right Washington think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently concluded: “Iraqis have little confidence in US and other international forces — Iraqis generally dislike the continued presence of US-led forces in their country; many consider the occupation to be ongoing despite the June 28 handover of sovereignty.”
The CSIS also found it is too late for the US to turn things round with quick improvements to the botched reconstruction process or by funding a massive job-creation program. “The occupation will not be judged by the sum of its consequences, but rather as occupation. Put simply, Iraqi pride in national sovereignty is more deeply rooted than the US anticipated,” its study says.
Popular feelings are percolating upwards and influencing the forthcoming Iraqi election campaign. The CSIS reports that “it is highly likely that the single unifying theme espoused by Iraq’s politicians will be to invite the US to leave Iraq once there is an elected Iraqi government in place”.
This being so, those in the US who see Iraq as a strategic asset and covet long-term bases will probably try to postpone the January elections. Noises are already being made that insecurity will prevent them being free. Iyad Allawi, the US-appointed prime minister, and other former exiles who returned to Iraq with no political base, have an incentive to delay the poll so as to perpetuate their power.
Some analysts are making gloomy predictions that Iraq will split apart if US troops pull out. Supporters of the fragmentation scenario include long-time backers of Kurdish independence, and their views are colored by that. Others claim to see a risk of violent clashes between Sunnis and Shiites and even civil war.
These forecasts are probably too pessimistic, but in the short term the greater danger is that the US will use the pretext of protecting the elections to try to “recapture” cities it has lost. This would be a disastrous mistake.
The UN election plan treats Iraq as a single constituency and makes it unnecessary for candidates or parties to campaign everywhere. Even if there were no violence, Shiite parties — such as Da’wa, Sciri, and Moqtada Sadr’s people (if they decide to run) — would not campaign in Sunni cities. In reverse, the same goes for the largely Sunni Iraqi Islamic party.
So the fact that Fallujah, Ramadi and other Sunni towns are virtually out of bounds to outsiders is not an argument for canceling the elections there. Cancellation would send a terrible signal, implying that Allawi and his US backers were trying to disenfranchise the Sunni and favor Shiites. This would be more likely to provoke sectarian conflict than any other measure.
Iraqis of almost all persuasions want elections, and the claim that the resistance is trying to block them has no evidence to back it. Most Iraqis, including the militias, see the elections as the best key to ending the occupation and getting the US to leave. Their views should be respected.
