YOKOSUKA, Japan, 3 October 2004 — Although, the presidential debate on foreign policy and homeland security turned out to be a long debate about the US war in Iraq, there was one issue that was barely explored but is also of grave importance. The issue of how Sen. Kerry would handle North Korea versus President Bush. While Bush defended the current six-party talks involving the US, South Korea, Japan, Russia, China and North Korea, Kerry stated that he would “immediately set out to have bilateral talks with North Korea”. He went on to say that North Korea has acquired more weapons during Bush’s term in office, implying that the nuclear buildup in that country is a direct result of poor foreign policy decisions by the current president. Joseph Biden, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee followed up on the Kerry point by saying that the Chinese want the US to sit down with North Korea and try and hammer out a solution to this nuclear problem.
So, once again you have to ask which one of these candidates has an in-depth understanding of a critical issue. The day before the debate, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing stated that the resolution of the nuclear issue through the framework of the six party talks is the only “feasible and correct” option. US Secretary of State Colin Powell who added that no other means of dealing with North Korea was being considered at this time echoed his comments. Both men expressed confidence that in spite of the failure to hold a fourth meeting in September, they were continuing to work toward additional talks in the future. So, why would Sen. Kerry should he become President Kerry, want to host bilateral meetings between the US and North Korea “immediately”? The answer to this question lies in his adoption of the previous administration’s approach to the problems with North Korea. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993 signaling a flirtation with nuclear development.
During the Clinton administration, former President Carter visited North Korea and hammered out the now famous Agreed Framework in 1994. Under this agreement North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for two new-pressured light-water reactors and 500,000 metric tons a year of heavy fuel oil to meet its energy needs until the first reactor became operational. Everyone looked like a winner and Carter was praised for his great negotiating abilities.
Over the next few years, South Korea, Japan and the European Union all agreed to support the agreement. Japan even signed a contract in 1999 committing $1 billion to help fund the new reactors. The problem was and still is, that the ink was no sooner dry on the agreement than North Korea began to think of weapons, not energy. A report to the US Congress in 1999 raised a number of real concerns about this agreement including the fact that “current US policy was not effectively addressing the threat posed by North Korean weapons of mass destruction, missiles and their proliferation”. In other words, the agreement was not working.
It should have come as no surprise to the Bush administration when in November 2002 Pyongyang Radio announced, “we now have nuclear and other strong military weapons due to nuclear threats by US imperialists”. The Bush administration broke off direct communication with North Korea and began to condemn their nuclear program in the eyes of the world. The basic policy, at that point, was that they refused to be subjected to “blackmail”, a reference to the fuel and international food programs for North Korea that did not stop that country from increasing its nuclear arsenal. In late 2003, the administration changed its mind and decided to proceed with the six-party talks but firmly refused any direct meetings. Administration officials have repeated their belief that a multinational approach works better with North Korea because they have a history of breaking agreements with the United States.
Now John Kerry is waving the flag of direct negotiations with North Korea. He has not said if he would also continue the six-party talks or not. What he is really saying is that he is willing to return to the concept of the failed agreement. What else is the explanation for saying to North Korea: If I am elected president we will meet with you and both our arms and our pocket books will be open? The question is, what makes him think this approach will work when North Korea is already empowered with nuclear weapons and has a history of not following through on the 1994 agreement?
Like the Carter agreement North Korea will accept any fuel, dollars and food handed to them but it does not follow that they will simply dismantle their nuclear arms program in return. After all, the only country to dismantle its nuclear program voluntarily is Libya and that was in response to watching the American invasion of neighboring Iraq.
— Adrienne McPhail is an American journalist located in Yokosuka, Japan. [email protected]
