As if the Palestinian Authority was the pinnacle of good governance, with a shining proud record of the all-encompassing democracy, fiscal transparency and national unity, until Marwan Barghouti, the ‘spoiler’ emerged from his prison cell and wickedly dashed Palestinian aspirations for the narrow benefit of his self-serving ego. Those who possibly believe in such jumbled logic are only deceiving themselves, and deliberately so. If Barghouti’s presidential candidacy is to be analyzed within its proper historic and political context, then this prevailing, albeit baffling judgment, which sees Barghouti as a threat to Palestinian national unity, should be altogether discarded.
A quick review of the Palestinian and Arab media will provide the theme they had in common: By announcing his candidacy just hours before the Dec. 1 deadline set forth by the elections commission, Barghouti has surely embarked on a dangerous bid against the ‘old guard’, risking not only the unity within the PLO’s largest faction, Fatah, but that within Palestinian society itself. It is “the wrong step”, according to Ramallah-based Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah, and “will most likely hurt his status within Fatah, as well as outside it,” according to Al-Ayyam newspaper.
This dodgy logic seems to comprise more than one faulty premise, rendering the whole argument inapt. To begin with, unity in the Fatah rank should not automatically translate into unity among the whole Palestinian population, since the movement barely represents one-third of the Palestinian constituency, and secondly, few are those who dare argue that true unity among the Fatah rank even exists.
Moreover, the term “unity” is itself employed hastily without scrutinizing its possible meanings. It was empirically proven that Palestinians more often solidify around an idea and a cause rather than around a mere party affiliation coupled with a cluster of empty slogans. Take for example the historic shift introduced by the current uprising, where a large swath of the Fatah movement seemed to have less in common with the traditional leadership than with the so-called Palestinian opposition: The Islamic and socialist parties. In fact, when the disparity between the PA’s traditional leadership and the “opposition” seemed irreconcilable, the armed wing of Fatah was much in tune with the political line of Hamas and the socialist PFLP.
Indeed, long before Barghouti dared to challenge the PA elite by throwing his bombshell candidacy, Fatah was slowly branching off into two major hierarchies and other countless interest groups. Barghouti’s decision to run, contrary to his traditional party’s nomination of Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Mazen for president, was a very high profile expression of that rift, but certainly not the origin. It is therefore more relevant to discuss and dissect the political line that Barghouti represents rather than his reasons for “gambling on almost everything”, according to a tasteless editorial offered by a Palestinian newspaper.
One way of comprehending what or whom Barghouti represents is by assessing the man’s own record as a person who strongly believed in peace with Israel on the basis of international law, lauded the Oslo accords and championed the ongoing Al-Aqsa Intifada with its armed and non-violent activities. Unlike others in his party, he is an eloquent and fiery leader, who can easily become a downright combatant if needed.
One of Israel’s attempts on his life was caught on camera. His dramatic kidnapping from Ramallah, also televised, is the standard sound bite continuously aired by Arabic language satellite television stations. His constituency is the younger generation which was raised on the Arafat coined phrase of “holding an olive branch in one hand and a machine gun in the other”. In short, Barghouti, in many ways, is Arafat in the early years of the struggle; while Abu Mazen is the antithesis of everything for which Arafat stood.
Much has been said about the “real” reasons that compelled Barghouti to run, despite the overwhelming support that Abu Mazen received by the traditional Beirut-to-Tunis leadership of Fatah. This leadership has been unfairly represented in the movement’s Central Committee and Revolutionary Council, two bodies that exclude almost entirely the Fatah experience in the Occupied Territories and the generation to which it gave birth.
The last election that helped assemble members of the FCC and the FRC was held long ago. Both bodies are viewed as stagnant and self-serving. Its members are affiliated with all sorts of scandals and corruption, yet they somehow manage to remain on top, since after all, they have been designated as the “moderates” in Palestinian society. Here once again, the term “moderate” “a designation that can only be imparted by the United States and Israeli governments — is granted to anyone who unconditionally rejects any form of armed struggle and is willing to address Israel’s “security needs”, altogether disregarding the needs of his own people. Thus, Abu Mazen earned the “moderate” badge for his condemnation of resistance as terror and dubbing the Intifada a “mistake”. Subsequently, the man’s popularity on the street is close to nil. It is a mistake to reduce the upcoming January elections as a battle of interests among individuals; far from it. Thus far, the candidates are a rational outcome of the political atmosphere in Palestinian society. For instance, Hamas’ refusal to endorse any candidate nor to present it’s own was to be expected, since the movement repudiates the political process (the Oslo accords) and institution (the Palestinian Authority) that brought about the elections. Unless a major overhaul takes place that frees the PA from its commitment to the political line of Oslo, Hamas will certainly maintain its position.
Equally understandable is Fatah’s discord spilling out onto the chart of presidential candidates. While it is true that the future of Fatah is no longer expected to include the movement’s current hierarchical structure, such realization shouldn’t be equated as a total disaster. Fatah has bloated over the years to include segments of the society that are neither revolutionary nor viewed as sacred to the Palestinian national constants.
By deciding to run as an independent candidate, Barghouti was neither a spoiler nor a fame-seeking rebel frightened by the prospects of being forgotten in his Israeli prison cell. It was a natural response to an internal crisis in Fatah, which has reached a point of leading the entire Palestinian struggle toward self-defeating quarrels, civil war and subsequent disintegration.
Fatah cannot possibly carry on without a unifying common cause. It’s the deviation of that cause that is threatening its unity. Barghouti’s course of action is at best an attempt to reunify the movement around the original idea of achieving freedom by any means necessary.
At worst, it is a reminder to the “old guard” that long gone are the days of hijacking the Palestinian cause so that the chosen few can maintain their tight grip on power at any cost.
