Mosul Attack Poses Serious Dilemmas for Occupation Forces

Author: 
Alastair Macdonald, Reuters
Publication Date: 
Fri, 2004-12-24 03:00

BAGHDAD, 24 December 2004 — The US military’s conclusion that a suicide bomber inside a US base was probably responsible for the deadliest strike on Americans in Iraq creates nightmare dilemmas for US forces.

Two months after twin suicide bombings struck at the heart of US political influence in Iraq, Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone government compound, Tuesday’s Mosul attack raises anxiety levels for troops, eroding any comfort zone in a country where they face incessant dangers outside their bases.

With the recruitment of Iraqis to security forces and other jobs inside US camps seen as vital to an exit strategy from Iraq for American soldiers, it could also sow mistrust.

At first sight, many will be surprised that a man strapped with explosives could somehow gain access in broad daylight not just to the sprawling airfield complex that is Forward Operating Base Marez in Mosul but walk right into the mess tent for lunch.

Yet US bases are teeming multinational villages where huge numbers of local security forces and Iraqi and foreign civilians mingle with American troops, eating in their canteens, sharing their shops and working with them to build new facilities. The sheer scale of movement in and out of these areas, however fortified they may appear with high walls, razor wire, watchtowers, mortar squads and helicopters, makes controlling what — and who — goes in and out virtually impossible.

“The sheer logistics of life support for the Americans make it physically impossible to check everything,” said a Western security consultant in Iraq, declining to be identified.

It seems unlikely the suicide bomber, claimed as a “martyr” by the Ansar Al-Sunna Islamist guerrilla group in northern Iraq, walked through security checks in Mosul carrying explosives.

“You could bring stuff in piece by piece, with different people,” said another security expert, who works in Baghdad. Elements of an explosive device could be hidden and assembled in any one of a thousand places on a sprawling base. For any one of hundreds of people, probably local, working as cleaners, builders, bazaar stallholders, or as police or National Guards, to then don some kind of explosive jacket, maybe even looking like standard body armor and wander into the “chow hall” at lunchtime would attract little attention.

Plenty of intelligence could be available from sympathizers. An attacker could even have joined Iraq’s fledgling security forces, or have a uniform and papers from one of the dozens of policemen and National Guards killed in Mosul in recent weeks.

Tightening security to try to filter out such attacks is in itself deeply disruptive to military operations.

Not only does the increased sense of personal danger put pressure on troops but measures to prevent a repeat can also be wearisome and add to combat zone stress. Two suicide bombers killed at least five people, including three Americans, at a cafe and market in Baghdad’s Green Zone within minutes of each other in October. The result has been tighter security controls and less freedom for troops, diplomats and contractors living in the zone, making life feel grimmer.

Practice varies from base to base around Iraq on personal security, ranging from the fairly relaxed — diners in Marez wore no body armor to protect them — to the severe, where body armor, helmets and weapons are always carried, even the dining hall, and kept to hand near the showers.

“You can do that of course,” said the security consultant. “But wearing a flak jacket for a year is pretty depressing. It’s not exactly ideal for morale.”

Keeping out infiltrators poses equally difficult challenges for a US military keen to hand over as much of Iraq’s security as quickly as possible to speed Americans’ return home.

“There are so many factors and so many tribal loyalties and family loyalties, you can never really be sure that the people you’re working with are 100 percent loyal,” the security consultant said. “If someone got into the National Guard, it’s quite possible they could turn out to be a suicide bomber.”

Former Pentagon official Anthony Cordesman made a similar point in a new report criticizing Washington for failing to recognize the scale of the insurgency. “It seems likely that family, clan and ethnic loyalties have made many supposedly loyal Iraqis become at least part-time sources,” he said.

Overzealous vetting could turn Iraqis against the presence of US forces. So compromises must be made.

“We’ve done what we have to do to screen the local nationals working here,” said Maj. Neal O’Brien, spokesman for US forces in Tikrit, between Mosul and Baghdad.

“We do everything we can to treat the people who work here respectfully. There’s a level of trust,” O’Brien said.

The Mosul attack seems likely to dent that trust, but the security consultant said: “The biggest blow will be to morale.”

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