The other day in Paris, I borrowed the crystal ball of a gypsy magician in Montmartre to steal a peep into 2005.
I know, as my media mentors always insisted, journalists should tackle neither the past — that is the task of historians — nor the future which is left to soothsayers.
Nevertheless, the temptation to be ahead of events is too great to resist.
Who wouldn’t want to see tomorrow’s headlines today?
Well, let us make a compromise, focusing only on our own neck of the wood, that is to say the Middle East. I cannot tell you what the events of 2005 will be. But I can tell you what the undercurrents that shape events are.
One can identify several undercurrents.
The first concerns the concept of political power and its provenance.
This is changing in a dramatic, though little noticed, way.
Traditionally, power in the Middle East has been shrouded in mystical fog, its origins traced to divine will, military conquest, charismatic leadership, and revolution. That view is now changing as more and more people in the region look to elections, that is to say the expression of people’s will, as the proper origin of political power — a power exercised in the interests of the whole community.
The 2005 calendar is filled with dates for elections.
Before January is out the Palestinians will go to the polls to elect a new president in their first truly pluralistic experience. And that is only the first step. Before the year is out they will also elect a new Parliament.
Next door, Israel, too, is almost certain to have elections in 2005.
Even with a grand coalition under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the people of Israel would have to be directly consulted on the momentous decisions in 2005.
At the end of January the people of Iraq are scheduled to go to the polls in the first free election in their history.
The importance of what is at stake cannot be overestimated.
Iraq is a key Arab and Muslim nation and the success or failure of its experiment will impact many other countries. What is happening in Iraq is the biggest political battle that the Arabs have experienced since they emerged as independent nation-states in the last century.
On one side there are forces that want Iraq to become part of the global mainstream where elections are the sole means of gaining and losing power.
On the other, we have all the forces of despotism, religious and secular, that are determined not to let Iraq choose a future through elections. Their position is clear: If we are not in power, Iraq should not exist.
After the Iraqi election, the focus will shift to elections in Saudi Arabia.
These are limited in scope and, thus, may not attract the same attention.
Nevertheless, the coming of electoral politics to Saudi Arabia is a revolutionary turning point in the political development of the Kingdom. Despite reports of initial tepid interest, my guess is that by the time the voting schedule begins many Saudis would decide to give it a try. Seen against the background of the series of national dialogues organized last year, plus a timid but welcome opening in the media, the municipal elections indicate the willingness of at least part of the Saudi elite to stay the course of reform.
Next, we shall have parliamentary elections in Lebanon in May.
These come at a time that Lebanon is moving to the center of international attention. The May elections could provide a mechanism for avoiding a major crisis with unforeseeable consequences. But they might also unleash forces that could threaten Lebanon’s existence.
In May or June Iran will hold presidential election.
Some may dismiss Iranian elections as meaningless because candidates are approved in advance by the authorities that could also cancel the results. Such a view is short-sighted. Even choreographed elections matter as we saw with Muhammad Khatami’s presidential victory in 1997. The ruling establishment could use the coming election either as an opening to civil society or as a switch to a policy of political iron-fist combined with economic liberalization — that is to say the Chinese model.
The New Year will also witness parliamentary and municipal elections in Afghanistan. The consolidation of the new Afghan state would not only help stabilize Central Asia but would have a positive impact on democratization throughout the region.
The second undercurrent likely to be with us in 2005 is terrorism in its many guises. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars served as needles that pierced old festering blisters. The destruction of the Taleban and the Saddamites forced terrorists of all ilks out of the woodwork to fight open battles.
Having geared themselves for a gangrene strategy, that is to say low— intensity warfare to wear out Arab and Muslim societies over a long period, these terrorists were dragged into open combat in both military and political battlefields where their defeat, no matter how long it takes to accomplish, is certain.
The third undercurrent that merits attention in 2005 is the deepening desire for reform. For the first time ever, reform and changes have become the main themes of Arab politics.
Last year dozens of conferences and seminars were held on the subject, and the 2005 calendar is dotted with many more.
Cynics would dismiss all these as nothing but a talkathon. But in politics talk does matter. The change of Arab political discourse, from one obsessed with religious themes, to one concerned with matters such as economic development and educational excellence, is a leap toward modernity. The political vocabulary of the Arabs, Iranians, Afghans and Pakistanis, is changing to welcome new words and phrases such as opening, accountability, good governance, human rights, pluralism, and diversity. Arab and other Muslim elites’ fascination with the ideological triplets of Marxism, fascistic nationalism, and Islamism is coming to a close, opening the space for the advance of liberal and democratic ideas. The women’s prise de conscience and the young people’s thirst for freedom and opportunity are among the factors that encourage hope for the future.
The next big idea for Arabs and Muslims may well be about the best way of joining the global mainstream as an active participant and not a real or imagined victim.
Having said all that there is, of course, no guarantee that my predictions will prove right.
The Middle East may well turn out to be the only part of the world hermetically closed to the global trends of democratization, economic development and social change. The Iraqi election may be disrupted or, if it goes ahead, produce a majority for some version of religious fascism. All the talk about reform and change may well end up as nothing but talk, a kind of political masturbation. The very idea of reform may etiolate under the impact of political lethargy and intellectual inertia.
None of the countries in our region is insured against the nastiest of surprises. The Middle East, as Gen. De Gaulle once observed, is designed to defy reality by living on the margin of probable impossibilities.
My predictions could, indeed, prove to be nothing but images in Alice’s mirror. I hope they won’t be. I also hope that if I am right everyone remembers, and, if I turn out to be wrong, no one does.
