It may have been only a lucky shot that downed the US military Chinook helicopter on June 28 in Afghanistan’s Kunar province. It was, however, only one shot from a noticeably increased quantity of shooting in Afghanistan. Washington would have the world believe that the upsurge in violence is because Afghan government troops, backed up by Americans, are taking the fight to the Taleban and Al-Qaeda elements that have regrouped along the Pakistani border.
This is only one part of the story. US seek-and-destroy missions in the difficult mountain terrain are probably having some impact on insurgent activity, even though last week’s operation to catch two leading political allies of ousted Taleban leader Mulla Omar failed despite a significant dragnet in the south of the country based on sophisticated electronic intelligence.
The Taleban are now using Al-Qaeda’s Iraq tactics and embarking upon targeted assassinations in urban areas. In Kandahar the second leading cleric and government supporter in six weeks was murdered by gunmen on Sunday. Privately senior officials in President Hamid Karzai’s administration now voice fears of a full-scale suicide bombing campaign.
The harsh truth is that the Taleban’s primary objective must be to undermine faith in the Afghan government. Their campaign needs to cause sufficient death and destruction to demonstrate the inability of the authorities to root them out along with sympathizers embedded in the population. If they can achieve this, then they can expect the country’s inherent fissiparous tendencies, with regional warlords reasserting greater control over their own affairs, thus further undermining the central government.
In the mountains, Taleban forces and their Al-Qaeda allies can continue to play cat and mouse with the Americans. Washington’s strategists ought to know full well how tough if not impossible it is to crush rebellion in the inhospitable margins of Afghanistan, since it was America that armed and equipped the Taleban and Al-Qaeda among other rebel groups during the Soviet occupation.
The only way to bring final peace to Afghanistan is through negotiations, the moment for which may already have passed. Ordinary Afghans who hoped not only for peace after 2001 but also massive flows of promised foreign aid to help modernize their country, must be feeling growing disappointment at the failed appearance of either. The less the outside world delivers on its generous pledges, the greater will be the disillusionment with the Karzai administration and its US-led foreign military supporters.
Last November the president received a qualified electoral mandate. In two months time Afghans are due to go to the polls again to elect a Parliament. Opinions may have already changed about the brave new world that the Karzai administration was supposed to herald. Nine months on, many voters may feel that their lives have become worse instead of better. Tragically it is certain that the Taleban and Al-Qaeda terrorists will be doing their bloody best to confirm this depressing impression.
