Will the road map meet the fate of its land-for-peace predecessors, and join the Mitchell Plan, Oslo Process, Madrid Process, and other incarnations in the proverbial dustbin of history?
While that question cannot yet be answered, it is important to recognize that the apparent collapse of the cease-fire in the occupied territories may not only signify the demise of yet another American-backed peace plan, but could prove politically fatal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
Abbas won the presidential election earlier this year with tepid support. Palestinians ultimately supported the established candidate in hopes that he could fill the security vacuum and rejuvenate the nascent peace process. Many voters, who have long since grown tired of PLO and PA graft, openly expressed their reservations about the choice. Abbas was victorious, but his mandate was far from expansive.
Shortly after the presidential election, Hamas outperformed PA candidates in local elections, winning outright in 48 municipalities — a sign that there was no longer tolerance for the ineffective politics of the past.
The Israeli contention that Abbas has failed to adequately lead the PA is grossly unfair. The problems Abbas faces are daunting — corruption, security, infrastructure, poverty, and economic malaise. And while the international community has acknowledged the severity of these problems, aid money has not flowed into PA coffers as quickly as was hoped.
Thus, even if Abbas had the bureaucratic infrastructure to quickly utilize foreign aid — which many doubt — he presently lacks the finances to do so.
There could be catastrophic consequences for Abbas when Israel withdraws from Gaza next month. In Gaza, it is Hamas, not the Palestinian Authority, which has the upper hand today. While the PA maintains de jure rule over the impoverished territory, Hamas is in de facto control. Hamas stands to gain most come August, and will paint Israel’s withdrawal as a capitulation to violent confrontation rather than negotiated settlement.
Some reject the comparison between Gaza and southern Lebanon, which Israel unilaterally abandoned in 2000. But just as Hezbollah declared victory in the wake of the Israeli move, Hamas will do likewise. When Ehud Barak announced Israeli plans to leave Lebanon without consulting the Lebanese or Syrians, Yasser Arafat believed his negotiation strategy had been fatally undermined. Abbas could be perceived similarly — getting nothing through the olive branch, while his rivals win with the gun.
Aware of Abbas’ precarious position, the Bush administration has supplied the beleaguered Palestinian leader with supportive rhetoric and promised $350 million in assistance. Bush has assigned Gen. Kip Ward to facilitate security cooperation, and former World Bank President James Wolfenson to address economic issues. But he has been unable to provide Abbas what he really needs, visible movement in lifting the burden of occupation off the Palestinian masses.
Congress has made it difficult for Bush to help Abbas. Pro-Israel activists successfully lobbied Congress to place restrictions on the Palestinian aid package, which Bush had specifically requested to provide flexibility that would allow direct assistance to the PA itself rather than flow to NGOs.
Abbas has been unable to dismantle the intrusive Israeli checkpoints, which hinder movement and retard economic activity. Nor has Abbas secured a settlement freeze — the most sensitive issue on the table for Palestinians. Construction of the Israeli security barrier — built entirely on Palestinian land — continues unabated. Israel continues to control all Palestinian borders, airspace, and access to the sea. Lastly, while August will likely see Hamas celebrate “victory” in Gaza, Abbas has no guarantee that Sharon will abide by the road map or that the US will pressure him to do so.
Meanwhile, many contend Prime Minister Sharon is under intense political pressure. It is true that right-wing settler and religious groups strongly oppose the Gaza plan, and have become increasingly aggressive, but Sharon sits on solid political ground, enjoying significant — though apathetic — support within the Likud Party, and strong — albeit temporary — backing from the left. But the perception that he is vulnerable has provided him with political capital, which he has spent in Washington. Though he unilaterally decided to ditch Gaza, in large part because it was no longer economically viable, US taxpayers are being asked to provide Israel $2.5 billion in assistance to pay for the move.
Perhaps in exchange for American largess, the White House will place restrictions on the aid. Certainly the list of potential demands — some of which could provide critical political support to Abbas — is long: Requiring movement on the road map; a freeze on settlement construction; a halt to construction on the security wall; opening up a Palestinian port or airport; or allowing Gazans to fish. Of course Israel has long opposed conditionality, but the idea even surfaced in Congress recently when veteran Congressman David Obey suggested that in exchange for its annual $2.7 billion in aid package, the State Department file a report regarding Israeli settlement activity.
Obey’s proposal was dismissed, but the notion of forcing compliance is not new. Bush’s father famously forced Israel’s hand in 1991. Regardless, Abbas is now in desperate need of a particular kind of assistance. In order to help, the White House must use political muscle to help convince the Palestinian people that the occupation will end.
— David Dumke is principal of the MidAmr Group.
