Many countries in the world are dealing with the negative fallout of shortsighted policies that included dangerous liaisons, unjust policies and wars of occupation. Pakistan too is dealing with this fallout. Yet as a member of the international community that collectively faces the problem of political violence and terrorism, Pakistan’s track record of cooperation is second to none. Over 500 men involved in terrorist operations have been nabbed and handed over to the concerned countries. Also intelligence-cum-operations cooperation with many countries including US, Saudi Arabia, UK, Egypt and other European and South East Asian countries is ongoing.
A problem on the home front however does exist for Pakistan. In the popular perception is a simple one — that Pakistan is involved in anti-terrorism operations because of Washington’s “diktat.” True, Sept. 11 is the watershed that catapulted the US and the international community into a focused and perhaps controversial operations mode on terrorism. But Pakistan’s domestic realities had long required action against elements that were spreading fear, hate and death.
This need was well documented in the tragic data that was generated year after year of targeted sectarian killings, and in the vigorous debate in the independent media urging that the government take action against groups involved in sectarian killings.
Often the criticism in the media was that the government’s actions did not match its concerns about sectarian killings. Only perhaps in 1998 the government did begin an earnest effort to capture the perpetrators of sectarian killings. But this effort was no fully backed by the organs of the state.
In fact the dread of sectarian groups, which carried out targeted killing of civilians, revenge killings and mass killing of innocents in bomb blasts in mosques and imambarghas, was so pervasive and paralyzing that it was often said that the judges hearing terrorism cases were unable to uphold law for fear of reprisals. In Pakistan terrorism and sectarianism in were almost synonymous.
Then it was also argued that an ideology of hate and intolerance, aggressively advocated in the name of Islam, was taking hold in the hearts and minds of some people.
Throughout the debate, it was argued that the government should deal with the hate and sectarian ideology at source. The “tool kit” often used to spread hate and intolerance in the name of religion included printed literature that was sold in open shops, distributed freely in some mohallas, mosques, madaris and imambarghas. In some cases the pulpit was used to preach sectarianism. The teachings in some madrasas were also blamed. While only a small minority of mosques, madrasas and imambarghas were involved in the spread of the hate ideology, in the public discourse the ability of this small number to undermine peaceful coexistence and peoples’ security was continuously highlighted.
Equally frustrating was the sociological and intellectual impact these sectarian groups, “enabled and empowered” by some Muslim states, were able to have on the Pakistani civil society. Obscurantism and extremism was promoted in social, political and intellectual space, all in the name of religion.
The civil society that opted to contest these elements was contemptuously branded as modern or Western and foreign agents. Often those arguing against these sectarian and extremist groups were against the nuclear bomb, against Pakistan’s Kashmir and India policy and the Taleban; so this branding was easy. Meanwhile powerful state institutions sided with groups advocating sectarianism and extremism.
In the late ’90s during Nawaz Sharif’s second term some efforts were launched to reform madrasas. But not much else was done.
While the debate continued at the intellectual level and its impact was also felt at the sociological level as a moral brigade emerged in a few cities to forcibly enforce what they believed to be religious edicts regarding music, videos, television programs (all “un-Islamic”) and dress code for women. Meanwhile fast spreading corruption and nepotism in public life, the erosion of the social contract between state and society, and developments in the Muslim world were turning millions in Pakistan toward organized and regimented religion.
Much of the public lament on where all this would lead the Pakistani society fell on deaf ears. While the government failed to deliver on its basic obligation toward the citizens — that of protecting the life, property, dignity and constitutional rights of its citizens — some of the state institutions were pursuing a policy that was perpetuating this hate and violence.
But the external pressures following 9/11 and subsequent developments within Pakistan including assassination attempts on high officials including President Musharraf, forced the government’s hand. It also exposed in most cases the direct and indirect linkages between groups responsible for sectarian killings inside Pakistan and planned terrorist operations abroad.
But the sad fact is that even now a majority in Pakistan is critical of the government’s anti-terrorism policy. They believe that the government is undermining Pakistan’s sovereignty as well as religious identity. Another charge is that innocent people are being targeted, that Pakistan is participating in a war against Muslims and that in responding so promptly to the US concerns after 9/11 and that of the UK after 7/7 Pakistan is showing an insensitivity to what is going on in Palestine, Iraq and even Kashmir.
Such criticism simply but powerfully points to some inadequacies in the concept and conduct of a policy that is undoubtedly in Pakistan’s best interest.
