The murder of Sri Lanka’s respected Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar is a serious blow to the peace process. Those denying this tragic fact are not helping affairs. At this time of claim and counterclaim, however, we must sincerely hope that both the Tamil and majority Sinhalese leaderships can step back and see whether the assassination cannot be used to restore, rather than destroy, the peace process.
The Tamil Tigers have denied any involvement in the murder. But no one is taking them seriously. The foreign minister was himself a Tamil, steadfastly against the breakup of Sri Lanka. Tamil rebels saw him as a traitor. Before the peace process began, they declared him their No. 1 target for assassination. That is why Kadirgamar enjoyed round-the-clock protection from what was described as an elite group of Sri Lankan Special Forces. The deployment of such high-level security also owed much to his role as close adviser and confidant of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, who is reportedly devastated by his loss.
The murder raises a number of serious questions, not least of which is how two snipers could apparently elude the tight security net to get so close to the man and shoot him dead.
It might be helpful to consider who benefits most from the murder. Chandrika’s administration certainly gains nothing and indeed loses much with Kadirgamar’s passing. Nor is it absolutely clear that the Tamil rebels achieve much from the minister’s removal, even of a man who was one of their fiercest critics. In fact, it could be argued that the blame already being heaped upon them seriously undermines their position in the snail-like negotiations that the ever-patient Norwegians have been overseeing.
So who gains most from the murder? The answer would seem to be extremist elements on either side who each believe that, despite the experience of 30 years of civil strife and the loss of 60,000 lives, it is still possible for them to win a military victory. Tamil terrorists have in the past demonstrated their ability not to be stopped by high security cordons and to assassinate leading politicians, most notably in 1993 when President Ranasinghe Premadasa was killed by a suicide bomber. The murderers this time could equally have been individuals inside the military who knew the arrangements for the foreign minister’s protection.
There are die-hard political and military elements within the Sinhalese majority who believe the peace process should never have begun and still want to crush the rebels. Among these people, Kadirgamar, as a Tamil, even one opposed to autonomy for fellow Tamils, was always an object of suspicion and hostility. This may have been increased by his closeness to the president. His murder would not only undermine the president and her commitment to the peace process but would remove the top Tamil from within the government. Whoever murdered Kadirgamar must not be allowed to deal the peace process a death blow as well. Moderates on both sides should use this crime as a reason to draw closer, rather than further apart, and in so doing, to finalize an enduring peace.
