It has been a gradual “coming out of the closet.” For Pakistan’s “no-borders plus” solution for Kashmir, it is expose time. The idea that was first briefly alluded to by Gen. Pervez Musharraf at his Delhi press conference in April is now being repeated by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and by Kashmiri leaders on both sides of the Line of Control. In April, Musharraf had insisted that there were solutions that do not include converting the LoC into an international border nor would they mean redrawing of existing borders. It would be a “win-win” situation for all the three parties and would make the people of Kashmir the key beneficiaries of such a solution.
Ever since Musharraf had put forward his idea of a six-district solution in 2004, one that was close to the Dixon proposal of district-wise plebiscite, he has not spelt out another one. However, he has led the more recent Pakistani thinking on how to move forward on Kashmir. It is a four step approach: One, identify the troubled areas; two, demilitarize the troubled areas; three, concede self-governance to the Kashmiris; and four, appoint a tripartite supra-body comprising the Kashmiris, Pakistanis and the Indians to oversee the functioning of the self-governing Kashmir. Perhaps, the most significant factor here has been Pakistan’s decision to put Azad Kashmir, a territory it has controlled since 1948 on the table too.
This new thinking in Islamabad for a potential Kashmir solution has been conveyed to the Indians during the back-channel and top-channel negotiations that largely focus on how to move towards resolving the dispute. Musharraf has shared these ideas with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
This potential “no-borders-plus” solution does acknowledge the primacy of the Kashmiri interests while addressing the dispute. It not only concedes to the Kashmiris the genuine autonomy that Pakistan’s Constitution and the Indian Constitution’s article 370 grants but opens the possibility of granting to them a substantive degree of self-governance jointly agreed upon by Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris.
In addition, the setting up of an overarching trilateral body that would jointly govern the newly configured Kashmir would mean that it’s more than autonomy for the Kashmiris. They would also have a chair at the “high policy table” that would determine the foreign and national security policies for a “new Kashmir.”
Such a solution would amount to a “no-border-plus” solution for the Kashmiris while not conceding self-determination insofar as giving the Kashmiris the choice to either join Pakistan or India. Instead it would allow them to be “joined with both.” Reflecting the regional political and strategic realities such a solution would rule out an independent Kashmir but would concede to the Kashmiris the complete exercise of “political self-determination.”
The pre-requisite for a “no-border-plus” solution is premised on flexibility to be shown by both Pakistan and India and acceptability by the Kashmiris. In fact, Pakistan has to move many positions away from its “plebiscite in the entire Jammu and Kashmir” position. This is not only a “minus plebiscite” position, but it is one that, most importantly, greatly dilutes the control that Pakistan has exercised over what is now called Azad Kashmir. The other areas of the Jammu and Kashmir now under Pakistan’s control that include the Northern Areas would be fully integrated into Pakistan while giving validity to the 1963 Pakistan-China border agreement under which some territory in Khunjerab was given to China.
Significantly, Pakistan is now willing to “walk the talk” on Kashmir. Multiple reasons, mostly home grown but also external ones, have led to this. Musharraf’s attempt to resolve Kashmir with an out of the box approach, however, is not unprecedented. Successive Pakistani governments have through back-channel negotiations with Delhi tried to find flexible solutions to Kashmir.
However, Musharraf’s “no-borders-plus” approach concedes the maximum to the primary party in the dispute, the Kashmiris. It is also a realistic approach insofar as it does not expect India to either unilaterally concede what it controls, even if on the back of tens of thousands of troops and spilling of Kashmiri blood. Instead it expects Pakistan and India to both partially cede political and administrative control to the Kashmiris.
This “no-borders-plus-approach” that Musharraf has discussed with the Indians, the Kashmiris and with others, had been kept under wraps until the earthquake. Within a week of the deadly quake that devastated Kashmir, Musharraf proposed that the freedom to cross the LoC be granted to the Kashmiris living on both sides of the line. He proposed that those very points on the LoC that Delhi had proposed as “meeting” points only be opened up as “crossing points” so that instead of merely meeting relatives at those points and then turning back, the divided Kashmiri families be allowed to travel across these five points. After some negotiations, Delhi did agree.
There is now more frequent Kashmiri movement across the LoC than there has ever been since the 1950s. India and some elements within the Pakistani policy-making institutions are not entirely comfortable with this movement but it is nevertheless taking place. And the Kashmiris are pleased with it. Even the pro-independence Kashmiri leader Yasin Malik conceded in a private discussion in Islamabad that “all the Kashmiris are happy about this opening up.”
In recent days, the demand for demilitarization and self-government has been raised by many. From the Pakistani side of Kashmir, Prime Minister Sikander Hayat has called for self-government and autonomy while from across the LoC, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq called for demilitarization in Kashmir.
Pakistan’s new approach has also attracted support from previous antagonists in the Kashmiri political line-up. Omar Abdullah, the articulate Kashmiri leader, is now more supportive of Islamabad’s position. He is publicly criticizing Delhi for not reciprocating Islamabad’s flexibility on Kashmir. In the coming days, Pakistan’s position on Kashmir will inevitably find greater support amongst the politicians in the Indian side of Kashmir.
Islamabad’s new approach is logical. However, how far can it resolve the Kashmir dispute will depend on how far the Indians are willing to go. Does Delhi want to tread the traditional path on Kashmir and believe that they can use continued Kashmiri killings by their forces, the cross-border terrorism stick against Pakistan and the strategic alliance with US to maintain the status quo on Kashmir?
The answer to this question will determine the possibilities of a solution. Without a change of heart in Delhi, the resolution of Kashmir is unlikely.
— Nasim Zehra is a fellow of Harvard University’s Asia Center, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
