Undoubtedly the dialogue between Pakistan and India has improved the atmosphere and reduced hostility. But what about progress on the settlement of disputes? On Kashmir there is recognition that it is a complex issue that would require more time, but there is talk of some forward movement on others. In this context Siachen is most relevant. That is one on which the two did get close to a settlement
On Siachen, India wants authentication of the existing positions it occupied in 1983. Its latest proposal has been to substitute the word “authentication” for “acknowledgement.” Pakistan however continues to call for the content of 1989 agreement as the basis for the resolution of the Siachen dispute. In 1989 both the countries agreed to withdraw troops so as “to conform to the positions held by the two countries at the time of signing of Simla Agreement.” In 1989 the defense secretaries of the two countries issued a statement calling for the military commanders of the two countries to work out the modalities of the withdrawal.
Subsequently the process for implementation was initiated and in 1992 the defense secretaries met to sign the agreement. The agreement was finalized between the two and the night before they had ironed out all the differences. However the next morning a few hours before the signing ceremony India’s N.N.Vohra informed his Pakistani counterpart Salim Abbas Jillani that it was not possible.
At present there are three issues that impede progress on Siachen.
First the question of authentication. The latest Indian position is that after Kargil India cannot go along with this agreement on Siachen unless “authentication” by Pakistan of current positions held by India is accepted by Pakistan. Pakistan’s transgression in Kargil was preceded by many transgressions of the LOC by India. Unlike Kargil that Pakistan had to vacate under international pressure, India did not vacate the positions it occupied along the LOC since the Simla Agreement. Pakistan argues that for India now to use Kargil as a justification for Pakistan acknowledging India’s illegal occupation of Siachen is unacceptable. Islamabad maintains that an agreement that will entail movement of troops from existing positions to new ones would imply acknowledgement of current Indian troop presence.
But clearly there seems to be a deadlock. India seeks stated authentication or acknowledgement. Pakistan refuses to concede either. However a compromise could be to have the formulation in the agreement clearly state the act of Indian occupation in 1983, Pakistan’s nonacceptance of occupation and then authentication of Indian troop presence within the context of occupation. .
The second issue is the differences on the zone of conflict. India maintains that the areas it occupied, around 27,000 square kilometers, in 1983 should constitute the zone of conflict. Pakistan maintains that the zone of conflict should constitute the entire area lying in the triangle within the three points of NJ 9842, Indira Koli pass and the Karakorum pass. In 1992 India had conceded the entire area as a zone of conflict.
Indian has also offered that in case Pakistan and India are unable to reach an agreement on Siachen, the two sides can agree on settling the dispute over the extension of the LOC beyond NJ9842. Pakistan meanwhile has sought settlement of Siachen before opening the LOC question that covers NJ9842. Pakistan’s position on NJ9842 remains that it should veer toward the Karakorum pass while India wants it to veer toward Indira Koli pass. Neither position is rooted in clear legality. Negotiation will be needed to settle the matter. The fact that the final agreement on NJ9842 has implications of territorial control by both countries makes it an important issue.
The third issue has been the establishment of civilian mountaineering posts in Siachen. India wants to maintain mountaineering posts even after troop withdrawal. Pakistan refuses to agree to the Indian demand.
However under the 1992 agreement Pakistan did concede this Indian demand. The 1992 agreement was formulated in an atmosphere of mutual give- and-take. India too had conceded to two Pakistani demands. One, the entire area would be acknowledged as the zone of conflict; second, unconditional Indian withdrawal from Siachen. Instead of authentication India had then asked for signed maps of the existing military positions in Siachen to be appended to the main agreement as an annex. Pakistan had agreed to the annexed maps with only Indian signatures. Pakistan would not sign and India had agreed.
Flexibility is needed to overcome these issues. On Siachen there is the 1992 bilateral agreement already in place. The two can build on it.
They can demonstrate to the international community their ability to maturely and successfully negotiate to settle outstanding disputes.
During the early 2005 meeting in New Delhi, Musharraf and Manmohan Singh had decided to continue to explore options on Kashmir and to resolve relatively less complicated disputes like Siachen and Sir Creek by January 2006. Negotiations during the foreign secretary-level talks must address the hurdles in the agreement. It will demonstrate Indian commitment to normalization.
This is an opportunity for India to demonstrate that it is willing to pursue an enlightened self-interest approach toward the neighborhood. A Siachen settlement can be the first success story of Pakistan-India dialogue process.
