WASHINGTON, D.C., 29 January 2006 — The Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its Arabic acronym Hamas, has won the majority vote in this week’s parliamentary elections in the West Bank and Gaza. This sets a new reality in the Middle East, one that cannot be ignored.
These elections demonstrate that more than half of the 1.3 million eligible voters in the Palestinian territories favored Hamas over Fatah. Why? Barring some exceptions, the majority of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza never tended to be overly religious. Since the early days of the Palestinian resistance, most groups (with the exception of Fatah) tended to lean more toward the left.
In an interview some five years ago, a Hamas official admitted that he believed Hamas would never win the majority in the Palestinian Authority.
“I am very realistic about the situation,” admitted Usama Hamdan, during an interview with this writer in Beirut. “I know that the Palestinians are not all going to turn suddenly religious. The most we can hope for is to win about 40 percent of the vote, and have our say in running the government.”
And at a later meeting, he added: “The best we can ever hope for is to win enough votes in the Palestinian Parliament, allowing us to have a minister or two in the government so that we can have our say in the way things are run, particularly in matters of importance to us,” said Hamdan.
Hamas’ new victory will upset the established order (and I use the term “order” very loosely in this case). However, it will also present a new dilemma to the Bush administration that has been calling for democratic reforms in the Middle East. How can Washington refuse to recognize the legitimate call from the people in a free and fair election? Democracy is not a pick by numbers game.
Israel and the United States now have to accept this reality: Hamas enters the government and in so doing begins to metamorphose from a guerrilla movement into a political entity. They will feel the responsibility of governance, and, just as importantly, they can be held accountable for future terror attacks in Israel.
Israel says it will not negotiate with Hamas because they are terrorists sworn to its destruction. Time to open a historical parenthesis: The region is filled with deals and handshakes made between former terrorists and those who once wished to hang them.
Menahem Begin, one of Israel’s most noted prime ministers, negotiated with Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat a lasting peace deal. Sadat and Begin shared a Nobel Peace Prize for their peacemaking efforts at Camp David. Yet Begin began his political career as a member of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, a group considered a terrorist organization by the British in Palestine. Had Begin been arrested by the Brits at the time, he would have been hanged. Begin learned how to make that difficult transition from underground guerrilla leader to a respected national statesman.
Yasser Arafat, the unchallenged head of the PLO, found it harder to make that change. While in practice he was the elected president of the PA, in essence he remained the eternal Fedayeen. Abu Mazen, his successor, has the natural instincts of a political leader, except he lacks the charisma or the strength to fight the corruption that his Fatah party is riddled with.
If Hamas, encouraged by its electoral victory, can make the transition from militancy (read acts of terrorism) to joining the political process in helping build the PA, it should be encouraged and engaged in dialogue by the United States and Israel.
Ironically, while Hamas remains on Israel and the United States’ terror lists, they are the ones to have built more health clinics, established schools and other social services in the absence of any real state infrastructure.
Hoping to boost Fatah’s chances, the Bush administration funneled some $2 million through USAID projects. But faced with the new realities, the US administration should show that it is thinking outside the box and invite Hamas to the table.
Israel will object, but for its own security, having Hamas sitting across a negotiating table — no matter now how much disdain the Israelis may have in negotiating with Hamas — it remains far better than having Hamas on the other side of the barrier/wall/fence plotting the next attack.
And following their electoral victory Hamas should also demonstrate it has matured by renouncing violence and encouraging dialogue.
(The Common Ground News Service)
— Claude Salhani is international editor and a political analyst with United Press International in Washington.
