For the first time since the creation of Iraq as a state in 1921, the country’s Shiite Muslim majority is now in a position of political leadership. Although five Shiites had served as prime minister at different times before the fall of the Baathist regime in 2003, the community had never been entrusted with the true captaincy of the ship of state.
According to the standard Shiite narrative, the community was eluded from positions of power as a result of a deal made by the Sunni Arab minority and the British “imperialists” who had carved Iraq out of the moribund Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I. However, that narrative is only partly true. The main reason for Shiites being pushed aside was their own decision to shun what they saw as a worldly power created by the British “infidel”, and to wait until the return of the Hidden Imam.
At any rate, what matters now is whether or not Shiites will succeed in proving that they deserve the position of leadership that accidents of history, and their demographic strength, has entrusted them with. With the formation of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s Cabinet, the Shiites now have a maximum of four years, that is to say until the next general election, to prove themselves — and the clock is ticking.
To succeed the Shiites need to undertake a major revision of their historic narrative and a serious reform of their political organizations.
The first thing they need to do is to stop playing the “eternal victim” modeled on Imam Hussein who was martyred in Karbala in the 7th century. Victimhood involves a great deal of self-pity, grudge, and pent-up anger — ingredients that do not make for a good leadership mix.
The Shiites also need to understand that they cannot hope to rule Iraq alone. Even now, the smooth functioning of the government depends on the willing cooperation not only of the Kurds, who are Sunni Muslims, but also of the Arab Sunni community. Thus, the Shiites need to distance themselves from sectarian politics. If the politics of new Iraq were to be conducted according to sectarian rules, any idea of creating a stable government in Baghdad would disappear. In fact, even in the existing National Assembly (Parliament) one could imagine a number of combinations in which Kurds, Arab Sunnis and secular Shiites would coalesce to provide an alternative to the current government leadership dominated by the Shiites.
In other words, to succeed, the Al-Maliki government needs to become less, not more, sectarian. One way to move in that direction is to de-emphasize the religious identity of the half a dozen or so parties that form the backbone of the Al-Maliki coalition. All of these parties have the adjective “Islamic” as part of their names. This may have been a good tactic while the Baath Party, which advocated secular nationalism and pan-Arabism, was in power. Under the Baath, the only space not fully covered by the party and its state was the mosque. It was thus inevitable that at least some opposition parties would assume a religious identity simply to survive.
New Iraq, however, is a developing democracy in which the public space is open to everyone, regardless of faith and/or ideology. There is thus no need for religious labels that in a Muslim majority country seem redundant at best while, at worst, they could degenerate into “takfir” (anathema and interdict). The role played by the Najaf howzah (seminary), and especially Grand Ayatollah Ali-Muhammad Sistani, in the crucial period that followed the war was a positive one by all accounts. Sistani and the howzah also deserve part of the credit for preventing the Shiites from walking into the trap of sectarian war as laid by non-Iraqi Arab jihadists in Iraq. All that, however, should not hide the fact that giving the Shiite clergy any permanent role in political decision-making would amount to a kiss of death for Iraq’s burgeoning democracy. This does not mean that the turbans should be shut out of politics altogether. There is no harm in mullahs to get themselves elected to Parliament like any other individual from any other background. However, the rules should be the same for a mullah as it is for a cab driver or a housewife seeking a political role through elections.
The Shiite parties also need to get rid of their revolutionary claims. In most cases, the “revolutionary” label was adopted to please the Khomeinist leadership in Tehran that, for two decades, acted as paymaster and protector for Iraqi Shiite dissidents. In a developing democracy, however, the label “revolutionary” cannot but indicate a party’s innate hostility to pluralism and changes of government through elections.
As they shed the religious and sectarian aspects of their identity, the Iraqi Shiite parties should develop new identities based on their socioeconomic roots, ideological leanings, and political priorities. In other words, they should transform these selves into modern political parties that win or lose elections on the basis of their programs, not their messianic predilections.
Last but not least, Iraqi Shiite parties need to put some clear blue waters between themselves and Tehran. This does not mean adopting a hostile stance against Iran. Such a policy would be doomed to failure if only because the two neighbors are so closely interlinked that, regardless of who rules in Tehran or Baghdad, are both doomed to live together, preferably in peace and amity.
One must also remember that Iran has always been a place of refuge for Iraqi Shiites and Kurds. In he 1980s, when Saddam Hussein was massacring Kurds and Shiites, their leaders, and hundreds of thousands of ordinary folk, had no safe haven other than Iran. Many Iraqi Shiite leaders would have preferred to seek refuge in Arab countries; but none would open its doors to them.
What new Iraq needs to do, however, is to deny Tehran, under the present regime or its successors, a special say in domestic Iraqi politics. Most Iraqis resent any politician or party that may be, rightly or wrongly, branded as “Made in Iran”. For Iraqi Shiites, the alternative to Iranophilia is not pan-Arab chauvinism, as the late Michel Aflaq, the Baathist guru, claimed. The alternative is “Uruqah” (Iraqi-ness) which emphasizes the peculiar identity of a multiethnic, multifaith nation that is, nonetheless, committed to its unity and diversity.
Iraqi Shiites also need to do away with their various militias. This does not mean that these should be disbanded overnight. That is neither possible nor desirable if only because some of the militias are currently doing part of the job that Iraq’s new and, yet weak, police force cannot undertake. In the longer-term, however, the new Iraqi democracy cannot develop without making sure that the state retains the monopoly of instruments of coercion and violence.
Ethnicism, sectarianism, Iranophilia, and pan-Arab chauvinism divide Iraq into numerous rivulets flowing in different directions. Uruqah, however, conceives of Iraq as numerous streams flowing toward one another to constitute a large river.
The good news is that more and more Iraqi Shiites are becoming aware of the need to change their outlook and political structures. Few “turbans” have been put in high-profile government positions. At the same time, Sistani has made it clear that he does not seek any form of control over the new government.
More importantly, the two main Shiite parties, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Islamic Al-Da’awah (Call) are debating major changes in their form and content to reflect the realities of a new situation that neither had anticipated. The SCIRI may soon drop the word “Revolution” from its name to underline its transformation into a mainstream political party rather than a semi-clandestine organization backed by a militia. Some in the SCIRI want the adjective “Islamic” to be also dropped so that the party can have an entirely new name.
Similar debates are starting within Al-Da’awah and the Islamic Fadhila (Virtue) Party. All that is good news. Iraqi Shiites need to change before they can help Iraq change for the better.
