The Israeli helicopter gunship attack on the office of Palestine Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh echoes the warning by the internal Israel security service Shin Bet on the day the Israeli corporal was captured, that if the soldier was not returned in 24 hours, “Israel will not allow the Palestinian government to survive.” That threat, and everything that has happened since has in turn, reinforced the widespread view that Israel has a much wider agenda than simply freeing one soldier.
It has been just over a week since Gilad Shalit was abducted; the Israeli reply has been completely out of proportion to the incident. Bridges have been bombed, an airport seized, a power station destroyed, elected Hamas officials arrested, flyers distributed suggesting that people be concerned about their fate, a menacing flight over Bashar Assad in Damascus, a strike on the office of the Interior Ministry on Thursday and on the headquarters of the prime minister two days later. The Israeli government wishes to convince us that all these actions are intended only to release Shalit. Actually, they look much more like annihilation and humiliation.
Israel’s operations in Gaza and the West Bank have as their aim not just an increase in pressure to get the release of its captured soldier but the weakening and if possible the collapse of the Hamas government. From the moment Hamas staked its claim in the Parliament in January Israel has been working overtime to try to reduce its power and effectiveness. The opportunity that afforded itself by the abduction was an added bonus too good to pass up.
That the unfolding events came just as Hamas and Fatah seemed to have struck a deal on a two-state solution, one in which Hamas would forsake its long-held position of not recognizing Israel, must also be factored in the equation. It could easily be argued that Israel did not want to face the reality that it would be dealing with Hamas at the negotiating table as equal partners. Rather, Tel Aviv is now seeking to deal with Hamas on the field of battle where the former has a marked edge. The issue now is how much further the Israelis will go if its soldier is not freed. It says it will not bow to demands that Palestinian prisoners be freed but there is precedent. It has negotiated for the release of its soldiers before, even the bodies of its soldiers, with the argument that it values them above all else. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, later killed by the Israelis, was freed by Israel in 1997 in exchange for two Israeli agents caught in Jordan.
In the meanwhile, the Israeli onslaught has done what nobody had yet been able to achieve: unite the divided Palestinian factions. The tactic of pressuring civilians, of collective punishment, has been tried before, and more than once. But what also happens under such extreme stress is that local divisions evaporate.
What Israel is currently undertaking is the act of a gang, not of a state. The issue is a soldier whom Israel wants brought home, not changing the face of Gaza.
