When Iraq was invaded analysts deplored the lack of cohesion in the official Arab system and bemoaned the inefficacy of the Arab League, which is the strategic arm of this system. Major Arab countries were fiercely admonished for failing to stop the invasion. The late Edward Said described the invasion as a catastrophe on a scale approaching that of 1948.
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in summer 2006 once again shook the Arab system to the core. There are three reasons for the public disenchantment.
First, the Arab system seemed confused about its priorities and thus failed to come to the help of a member country. Second, Arab inaction encouraged Israel to act with more brutality and impunity. Third, outsiders seemed to decide the course of the conflict according to their agenda, on top of which is the creation of a new Middle East. Some analysts see the crisis of the Arab system as a temporary one related to the changes in the international order following 9/11. Others focus on restructuring the Arab League rather than rethinking the strategy that gave birth to that institution six decades ago.
The Arab official system is in deep crisis. The war on Lebanon has made that much clear. Arab foreign ministers wanted to refer the war to the UN Security Council simply because they couldn’t take a unified stand on the matter. Also, the Arab League failed to hold an emergency summit to discuss the war. This means the capabilities of the Arab system obviously exceed its expectations. Not only that: Current expectations often impede the smooth functioning of the system.
Although there is no paucity of arguments for unity, wishful thinking alone cannot produce a working regional system. The desire for unity has supplanted the pragmatism that is necessary for any regional system to operate.
Analysts often jump to conclusions before examining the root causes of the problem. This is why they criticize the Arab League instead of looking at the historic dilemma that has to do with the Arab world’s self-perception. With every Arab crisis that comes along, analysts wonder whether the Arab system is capable of meeting its responsibilities. This, however, is the wrong question, and because we ask it so often, we’re as far as ever from the answer.
Criticism of the Arab League has become the easy way out. It has turned into a smokescreen that hides the real problems of the Arab system.
Since the creation of the Arab League in 1945, the perceptions, goals, and functions of the Arab system have shifted.
The Arab system needs to adapt to two sets of changes: Domestic politics changed and so did the public’s perception of the role of the system; and the international scene shifted in a way that had far-reaching repercussions for the structure and efficacy of the Arab system.
In both cases, the Arab system failed to keep pace with new developments.
From the 1948 catastrophe to the 1967 disaster, the Arab system managed to function somehow. It even survived the “moral” dilemma of the 1978 peace treaty. Even the Iraq-Iran war didn’t seem to shake the system to the roots.
But decay has finally caught on. The façade of homogeneity has finally proved too thin to hide the ideological and cultural dilemmas inherent in the Arab system. The first serious divisions emerged over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. These divisions demonstrated the flaws inherent in the way that member countries perceived the system’s functions and goals.
The divisions got worse during the 1990s, for the system lacked a corrective mechanism.
Despite its pernicious ailment, the Arab system had its moments of clarity. One of those moments was in 1996, when Egypt called for a summit after Israel’s extreme right took office. Another was in 2000, when a summit was held in support of the second (Al Aqsa) Intifada. But the Arab system was not willing to address its own tribulations, and sooner or later its malaise became evident to all and sundry.
Harmony was gone, but the cracks were papered over rather than appropriately addressed. The system was supposed to learn from its difficult moments, but it never did.
Will the Arab system succumb to pressure from outsiders? Will it implode from within? Will non-Arab scenarios, such as “the new Middle East,” surpass it? These questions are all relevant now.
During the war on Lebanon, some major Arab countries took positions that seemed shocking at first glance. But these very positions, odd as they may have seemed, could serve as a harbinger of a new Arab system. Perhaps functionality will finally replace the top-heavy demagoguery that characterized the Arab system for the past 60 years. It is refreshing, for once, to see nationalist-inspired realism replace the bravado of collective action. A lot, of course, would depend on how closely the vision of the regimes reflects the interests of their nations. The Arab system is a system for collective action. But this collective action should tally with the public’s sentiments, not with the desire of leaders to posture and jockey for power.
Regional bonds are meaningful only so long as they tally with the interests of each Arab country. This is the point that one has to keep in mind whenever reform of the Arab system is brought up. A methodical rethinking of the dynamics of the Arab system is in order. We have to assess our ability to work in harmony, and we need to recognize our limitations.
The trick is to motivate various countries to remain within the system. And just as important, the system has to recognize and adapt to changes on the international scene. In other words, we have to strike a balance between our capabilities and expectations.
It is easy to criticize the Arab system and its institutions, including the Arab League. It is easy to criticize individual Arab states. But this is not going to get us anywhere. We have to address the root of the problem. We have to look at the goals and common interests that connect the units of our system. We have to look at the old bonds and ask ourselves if they can still keep the system together.
My guess is that we have to rebuild the Arab regional system on more durable and meaningful foundations. We have to think of what each country wants. We cannot keep thinking in terms of external threats alone. If anything good has come out of the war on Lebanon it is the realization that we need an Arab system that works.
— Khalil Al-Anani is a political analyst for Al Siyasa Al Dawliya magazine published by Al Ahram. Acknowledgement to Common Ground News Service (CGNews)
