Editorial: Politics of Brute Force

Author: 
2 October 2006
Publication Date: 
Mon, 2006-10-02 03:00

SIX weeks after the cease-fire that ended the war between Israel and Lebanon, the last of Israel’s soldiers have left Lebanese soil. They leave after having decimated Lebanon. The 34 days of fighting killed 1,200 Lebanese, mostly civilians and displaced a quarter of a million more. Its bombing campaign sliced the country into pieces and caused more than $2.5 billion in damage. The war left up to a million cluster bomblets many of which remain unexploded in southern Lebanon. And it left Lebanon virtually on its own for a month before the international community finally decided enough was enough with the issuing of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 which called for an international force in southern Lebanon.

Yet despite the destruction wrought by Israel, there is little sense of victory within the Jewish state. In fact, no one in Israel actually disputes that Israel failed in the war on Lebanon. Although the war had widespread support in Israel at its start, by the time it ended, support for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had tumbled because of the army’s failure to crush Hezbollah. Israel’s army chief Dan Halutz himself aimed criticism at his own troops, qualifying the result in Lebanon as being “mediocre.” Almost 160 Israelis, mostly soldiers, were killed. And Hezbollah is still holding captive two Israeli soldiers whose abduction sparked off the conflict.

The contention in Israel revolves around not whether Israel failed but why and who to hold responsible. Opinion polls show Israelis feel more insecure now than they have at any time over the past 10 years and that they no longer trust the leaders they elected just six months ago. Both results reflect the bitter public mood that followed Israel’s summer military humiliation in Lebanon.

The politics of brute force collapsed in Lebanon. Israel had hoped to revive the deterrent power it had long depended upon, but emerged from the war with the mystique more shattered than ever. Israel’s air force, which has not only been a major component of the deterrent principle but also a long-fabled instrument of offensive battle against Arab resistance, in spite of the enormous destruction it wrought, failed to crush the will of the Lebanese.

The war in Lebanon put paid to that fundamental corollary of Israel, which is to export the war to enemy territory and keep it out of Israeli territory. That Israel’s air force could do nothing to halt the increasingly heavier missile bombardment of northern Israeli towns and cities eventually compelled Israel to send in land forces, which only exacerbated the military predicament.

While Israel sees the deployment of Lebanese troops and a beefed up UN force to southern Lebanon as a success, most Israelis share a sense of unfinished business. Most believe that the fight with Hezbollah is not over once and for all, especially after Hezbollah rejected international calls for it to disarm. To be sure, given the damage done to Israel’s reputation, the chances of Israel launching another all-out onslaught on Lebanon anytime soon is slim. But given Israel’s burning desire to avenge its name, another conflict is not entirely out of the question.

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