The Sept. 27 trilateral summit on Afghanistan convened by US President George Bush to ensure cooperation between Islamabad and Kabul, the two key US allies in "war on terror," has produced two results. One, jirgas on both sides of the Durand Line will be convened and be jointly addressed by presidents Musharraf and Hamid Karzai. Two, the two presidents will refrain from publicly attacking each other. Recently Karzai accused Pakistan of protecting and training "snakes." Musharraf compared Karzai to an ostrich - a man in denial of the problems within Afghanistan.
The Washington summit may have mildly reduced tensions between the two. But the more fundamental issues of restoring the trust factor in Pakistan-Afghan relations and jointly managing the resurgent Taleban will take much greater effort. For this the presidents of Pakistan and Afghanistan must "read from the same page."
However concerns of the two sides prevent a common read. Kabul believes that Islamabad needs to do more to control the insurgency. Islamabad's concern is the anti-Pakistani sentiment within the Karzai setup. Islamabad will be more willing to help a Karzai who increases the representation of Pushtun, the majority in Afghanistan, in his government. A corollary of this would be reduced dependence on the Tajiks and the Uzbeks who are a minority and pro-India.
In the last one year the Taleban have regrouped as a formidable insurgency. They are a battle-hardened group enjoying a degree of local support. They draw their political relevance from Kabul's blundering incumbents. On Sept. 29 the NATO Chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told the BBC that the Atlantic organization was fighting to stop Afghanistan returning to a "terror training camp...We have to stay the course and we will stay the course - and we will prevail."
There are almost 30,000 NATO troops, which include 12,000 US troops in Afghanistan. NATO is seeking an additional 2500 troops.
Washington's domestic political compulsions trump all other concerns. The Bush presidency goes into the mid-term congressional elections in November with numerous fiascos on its plate - Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan. Bush desperately needs a success. With Iraq slipping out of control Washington needs a success in Afghanistan. So Washington is trying the traditional tribal route that Pakistan has opted for in Waziristan. Washington's policy institutions are busy seeking expert advise on how to revive the traditional Afghan system to work on the judiciary, the army, the police and narcotics control.
Rising civilian casualties plus hundreds of Taleban deaths will trigger local resentment against NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Taleban also battle from peoples' homes, schools etc. Hence civilians often become directly targeted in armed encounters between Taleban-ISAF forces. Significantly suicide bombers have been at the core of the resurgence of the Taleban. They routinely target NATO troops. In the last week alone there have been three major suicide bombings killing civilians and ISAF soldiers. This makes conventional security concepts stand on their head. What Israelis discovered in Lebanon, the Soviets found out in Afghanistan, the Americans learned in Iraq, the ISAF is discovering in Afghanistan.
Islamabad has tried various approaches to dealing with the support to the Afghan Taleban from its side. None has really worked. The difficult terrain of the tribal areas, the fiercely autonomous local tribesmen with cultural, historical and even ideological affinity with the Afghan Taleban - all work in favor of the Taleban. Pakistani Taleban in the bordering areas of NWFP and Balochistan would support the Afghan Taleban. Afghan Taleban, formerly supported by Pakistan, may also receive support from some former Pakistani intelligence officers who have previously worked them. Gen. Musharraf recently conceded this on Oct. 1 in a US television program.
The September deal between Pakistan and the local tribal jirga of elders was yet another attempt to control cross-border movement into Afghanistan. However the deal is showing more holes than success potential.
Pakistan's handling of the problem on its side has included deployment of 80,000 soldiers in the Waziristan agency, conducting operations to capture and evict foreign militants and destroy their bases, allowing US predators to shoot at targets inside Pakistan and also conduct on an ongoing basis join CIA-ISI operations inside Pakistani territory.
Like in all intelligence operations there is more to the cooperation than is made public. For example the US military's direct targeting of Al-Qaeda operatives on Pakistani territory, from unmanned Predator aircraft using Hell Fire missiles. The Pakistani journalist Hidayatullah publicized this fact on Dec. 25. He published photographs to show that an American missile killed the Al-Qaeda operative. This contradicted the Pakistan Army's account of the death. Within days, Hidayatullah was found dead wearing government-issued handcuffs. His family charges the army with his death.
A more startling revelation has come from a former army Gen. Ali Kuli Khan. He claims that about five Pakistani Army officers were court-martialed because they refused to fire on their own people in Waziristan. This shows the extent to which the Musharraf government supports the US war on terrorism.
But none of this is sufficient. Washington and others want an immediate victory. Their time-line is unrealistic. It is oblivious of the complexities of guerrilla warfare.
Above all the negative impact on the Pakistani state and society of the anti-Soviet jihad of the eighties is never fully appreciated. Meanwhile for any successful handling of Afghanistan, it is essential for Islamabad to "go the extra mile" in helping Afghanistan deal with its Taleban problem. But Pakistan has to be confident that by supporting Kabul, its own interests are not undermined. Hence Islamabad's fears of a dual front, one on its eastern border and the other on the western front with Indian interference in Balochistan from the southern Afghanistan, must be addressed.
Afghanistan is tethering at the brink of another bloody conflict. Only a comprehensive politico-military strategy and close Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation may prevent the return of widespread anarchy and violence in Afghanistan.
