Economies undergoing major transition generally experience considerable social stress. It was true during the first Industrial Revolution in Britain. It was true of the United States in the 19th century. It is true now of China and India as they surge toward economic superpower status. However in China the stresses are showing far more clearly.
The state-owned Xinhua news agency has surprised Sinologists by publishing a frank report on the tensions being experienced, largely in poor rural regions as a result of pell-mell economic growth. It has just admitted: “The huge number and broad scope of mass incidents has become the most outstanding problem that seriously impacts social stability”.
There are two conclusions that may be drawn from this announcement. The first is that for the authorities to give publicity to the problem suggests that it may be even more serious than they care to report. The second conclusion is that the Chinese government, or at least influential elements within it, is not prepared to try and sweep the troubles under the table or deal with them in the ruthless way that dissent was once handled in China.
The Chinese Communist leadership has been wrongly criticized as hypocritical for embracing capitalism. It was the inspiration of the late Deng Xiaoping that the true Marxist Communist state could not come into being until China had passed through the stage of capitalism. Therefore Marxist ideologues, of which there are still many in the leadership, can be content that in purely dialectical terms, the country is working through the process predicted by Marx. There is of course a much greater number of Chinese who don’t subscribe to this notion at all. China’s burgeoning class of industrialists is too busy making ever-bigger fortunes to give a moment’s consideration to the idea that the country is pursuing its historic Marxist destiny. But the whole point about Marxism was that it empowered the proletariat. To the consternation of the Communist leadership, in large parts of the country, precisely the opposite is happening.
The Xinhua agency has said that two years ago police had to deal with 74,000 mass protests involving some 3.8 million demonstrators. This year, up to September, the official figure was down to nearer 18,000. This may reflect a less confrontational, more accommodating policy toward local protest, following the widely condemned gunning down of three anti-power station protesters in Dongzhou, Guangdong, a year ago.
What clearly concerns the authorities is that these popular protests are becoming “politicized.” In Beijing’s book this is tantamount to treason. Unfortunately in a one-party state, where the role of local Communist functionaries may be compromised by official or unofficial links to big business, politicization is almost inevitable. Desperate peasants will turn to their community leaders and seek to organize their protest, if the Communist Party, whose very existence is based on their protection, does not do its job properly.
