Surely no one now doubts China’s emergence as an economic giant. Whatever short-term turbulence may lie ahead as its financial system adjusts and expands, Chinese business has stamped its mark on world trade. Now there are hopeful signs that Beijing is finessing its economic muscle into diplomatic influence in a way that Japan, the first Asian economic superpower, never did.
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing is midway through a seven-nation tour of African countries — Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Chad, the Central African Republic, Eritrea and Botswana. He brings a program of debt forgiveness, fresh credits and deals to help these largely poor and underdeveloped states improve their economies. There are undoubtedly commercial opportunities here for Chinese business, not least in the supply of raw materials, but there is more to this progress through countries which have often been neglected by the West.
The Chinese come to Africa with minimal political baggage. They are not identified with US-inspired hectoring by the IMF and World Bank over corruption, inefficiency and the lack of economic reform. Beijing’s diplomats are not judgmental about dictatorships such as Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. Apart from financial and infrastructural support for a few states such as Julius Nyrere’s Tanzania during the Cold War when Beijing was a doctrinaire member of the Communist bloc, Chinese engagement was actually very limited until the late 1990s. High-level delegations have since gained commitments for important commodity supplies such as oil from Nigeria and chrome from Zambia. It is, however, noteworthy that Beijing has been just as attentive to smaller states which have far less to offer commercially.
In the coming years, much attention will focus on how China makes diplomatic use of the good will and influence it is building in Africa. All eyes are currently on how Beijing is handling its involvement in Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran’s chief nuclear negotiator has just been in Beijing for talks on the standoff between his country and the UN Security Council. The Chinese stuck to the UN line and demanded a “serious response” to demands that the Iranian nuclear program be once again opened up to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the same time, the Chinese made it crystal clear that they would not countenance any US or Israeli attack on Tehran’s nuclear facilities. A resolution had to come through negotiations.
Given the abject failure of US military power in Iraq and the increasing problems in Afghanistan, there is clearly no alternative to talking. The Chinese certainly want Iranian oil but they also want to stabilize the Middle East. Wider conflict would plunge the world into uncertainty which would damage trade and thus China’s growth. If the Iranians allow Beijing to broker a deal acceptable to the IAEA and the wider UN, they will bring a welcome new and powerful influence into the region.
