Being the US secretary of state for defense is no longer the great job it used to be — as the current incumbent, Robert Gates, is no doubt discovering. He has just spent the past two weeks globetrotting and fending off fear, failure and fall-out — from the ongoing threat of a nuclear Iran, an unsuccessful “upsurge” in Iraq and a successfully resurgent Taleban in Afghanistan, and an angry Russia — without much to offer.
On the other hand, while he has much credit in hand around the world by simply not being Donald Rumsfeld, he has yet to show much creativity on any issue — least of all missile defense, which in some ways is most in need of some strategic thinking, not to mention planning. Unfortunately, neither is much in evidence in Washington these days, and not just in the Department of Defense.
In reality, missile defense encompasses two separate issues, which have now been conflated: US ballistic missile defense and Russia’s place in the world — which has now become a central issue for Putin and his presidency. To this extent, the US defense shield has played right into his hands, as his speech Thursday made exceptionally clear: It was extremely bellicose, but cast as a just national response to the US action.
US missile defense dates back to the heady days of the Regan administration, which first showed interest in developing a scheme for missiles to intercept missiles; and ever since the US has sunk billions into developing it.
Though the efficacy of the system has yet to be properly proven — a lot depends on how you read the statistics of the test launches regarding the success rate of interception at each stage of a missile flight — there are now interceptor missiles in California and Alaska, and a network of relevant industrial and military facilities in the US and other parts of the world has begun to emerge. This network was always intended to include at least one but probably more European sites; however, in the wake of the Iraq War and especially the deteriorating relations with the possibly soon-to-be nuclear-armed Iran, the urgency for deploying the missiles into Europe has been massively increased from the US perspective.
It is this urgency which has driven it to call upon European allies to accept the missiles on their territory — which is ultimately quite understandable.
Less understandable, but hardly surprising given the current US administration, is the high-handed manner in which the deed is being done: The potential sites for radars and interceptors are in Poland and the Czech Republic, and discussions with both have been conducted on a purely bi-lateral basis — with complete disregard for either the wider context of allies in Europe, or the sensitivities of Russia.
Russia still considers Central and Eastern Europe its backyard, and resents the independence of some of the states there. However, it also has genuine security concerns regarding its Western border with states that were once its possessions in the Soviet empire and are now members of the EU — and NATO, its historic enemy. It was precisely in order to diffuse such concerns that the NATO-Russia Council was created, and it is precisely in that forum that the issue of sites for missile defense could have been discussed, if the US had sought to not be needlessly provocative.
This is especially true now, at a time in which Russia is seeking to re-exert itself globally, and could therefore use any excuse to suggest a slight. To simply hand over such an excuse is sloppy diplomacy at best, and dangerous, not least to most Europeans who could literally be affected by the fallout, at worst.
Much belatedly, the US has become aware of this problem — which was why Secretary Gates made his way to Moscow this week, and the NATO-Russia Council is finally convening. But given the level of Russian anger and the near-Cold War statements, it seems Gates’ visit was a case of too little too late: He repeated both the belated explanations and offers made by more junior US emissaries in the previous week, namely that the sites were intended as forward defense against Iranian missiles and not against Russia, and to this end some plans and sites could be shared with the Russians.
The latter however, were not to be placated: they feel they have a legitimate edge on the US, their former satellite states and, therefore, the EU — and they have no intention of relinquishing it. Rather, they probably have every intention of embellishing it in order to justify an increase in military spending in order to regain a more equitable global position of power.
It is this combative frame of mind that they are bringing to the belated NATO-Russia Council meeting, which rather than a forum of cooperation will therefore revert to one of recrimination. That is a great pity, since a resurgent Cold War, even a scaled-back version, is the last thing the world now needs. On the other hand, it is unfortunately the strategic game Gates and Rice, along with many others in the US administration, still understand best, as does Putin. Perhaps they are just in the business of turning back time?
