For the last two weeks, the Lebanese Army has been involved in a severe confrontation with “Fatah Al-Islam” — an organization identified with Al-Qaeda. Dozens of Fatah Al-Islam members are holed up in the Nahr Al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli. The government of Fuad Siniora, which enjoys political and military backing from regional and international actors, is determined to force Fatah Al-Islam to surrender and it views this event as not just a serious security challenge but mainly as an important test of strength despite the high price on ground.
The confrontation once again focuses attention on Lebanon’s fragile stability, with several implications for the regional system.
Members of Fatah Al-Islam are working to entrench their influence among Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese Sunnis by exploiting the weakness of the Lebanese government and the leadership of the Palestinian factions. They are not a natural part of the Lebanese environment and do not play according to accepted “Lebanese rules,” which even powerful Lebanese organizations like Hezbollah take into account. Moreover, they see the Lebanese government as part of the American-Israeli “project” for the region and therefore as a legitimate target of attack.
The latest confrontation in Nahr Al-Bared also refocuses attention on the 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who live in dire humanitarian conditions and are seen by Lebanese as a ticking bomb. The weakened authority of the local Palestinian leadership (riven by ceaseless internecine conflicts), the sharp split in Palestinian politics and the lack of a strong Palestinian political center outside Lebanon all provide fertile ground for the infusion of more radical, militant elements, like Fatah Al-Islam. In this reality, the “right of return” may again become the subject of regional and international debate, though from the Lebanese government’s perspective that is the only solution to the problem of the Palestinians in Lebanon.
The Lebanese Army bears most of the burden for carrying out the political and security agenda of the Siniora government with respect to implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 in south Lebanon, preventing the smuggling of weapons across the Syrian border, and confronting domestic terrorist threats. In none of these missions has it acquitted itself with great distinction.
The latest confrontation in Nahr Al-Bared, which has only aggravated tensions among Palestinians, has again exposed the army’s clumsiness and limited ability to function as an effective counterterror force. Still, the way in which the army concludes this affair will be an important indicator of its deterrence and enforcement capabilities and a litmus test of its ability to meet a series of other challenges. Failure to deal vigorously with the threat of Al-Qaeda-type organizations will play into Hezbollah’s hands; a show of army weakness will legitimize Hezbollah demands to act as the country’s main defender. In the midst of this maelstrom, Hezbollah prefers to adopt a neutral stance.
It is undoubtedly concerned that the incident will end in a way that raises the stature of the Siniora government and the army eliciting more international backing for them; after all, the army may eventually be called on to disarm Hezbollah, so Hezbollah prefers that it remain nothing more than a hollow symbol of Lebanese unity. These developments may also complicate its efforts to bring down the Siniora government and may generate a renewed public debate about the disarming of all militias — first, the Palestinians’ but then Hezbollah’s.
However, matters are too complicated to permit acting only on the basis of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” principle.
Hezbollah, which is trying to rebuff charges that it is a servant of foreign interests, does not want to be tied to an organization identified with Al-Qaeda. On the contrary, the strengthening in Lebanon of global jihad elements, most of whom are anti-Shiite, constitutes a threat to Hezbollah as well, because their actions could suck Hezbollah into an all-out Sunni-Shiite war or provoke another round of fighting with Israel if they were to succeed in opening a terror front from Lebanon. Thus, paradoxically, Hezbollah and the Siniora government find themselves in the same camp against Sunni radicalism as represented by Fatah Al-Islam and other such organizations. Indeed, Syria is also part of this camp, since it, too, feels threatened by the activities of global jihadists in its territory.
Any escalation of their activities could push Hezbollah into a united front with the Siniora government, and that would force the two sides to reach some compromise in the ongoing political confrontation between them. By contrast, it would be more difficult to bring Syria to play a constructive role — at least in terms of more effective action to prevent infiltration into Lebanon — because Syria has no interest in helping to stabilize Lebanon. Instead, Syria can only gain from the crisis in Lebanon, especially now that the United States, France and Britain have managed to pass a Security Council resolution establishing an international tribunal to judge those responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (a measure that requires Lebanese ratification). Syria will probably make any assistance to Lebanon conditional on elimination of the pressure on the Hariri issue.
