Sir Jock Stirrup? Never heard of him most people would say, if asked, in Britain. It sounds like a minor and elderly part in a Shakespearian play. But Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, who was awarded the Air Force Cross for gallantry in 1983, has an important part to play in Britain in 2007 as chief of the defense staff. Trained as a Fighter Reconnaissance Pilot, he served with the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force (1973-75). He was also an “Exchange Pilot” with the United States Air Force — an admirable scheme which involves some of the top pilots of both air forces.
On Oct. 8, an interview he gave to Michael Evans, the defense editor of The Times, was published. This interview was unusual for Sir Jock has made a point of keeping out of the limelight, unlike some of his predecessors and the present head of the army, Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt. It is difficult to answer the question how much the chief of the defense staff should be both seen and heard in public. Clearly he must speak freely, frankly and often to the secretary of state for defense, and when necessary, to the prime minister of the day behind closed doors. But it could be argued that over Iraq and Afghanistan — which is becoming increasingly important for the United Kingdom — the public should be aware of the thoughts and opinions of the man paid to lead the Armed Forces of the Crown and the highly professional men and women who serve in them.
At present this is a much disputed area of public life. Both the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are unpopular with the public; this is especially so with Iraq where there is a growing belief that British soldiers are achieving all too little while being in great danger. Their total number in Iraq is falling fast, and it looks as if they could all be out by the end of 2008.
Des Browne, a close Scottish colleague of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, is badly miscast as the secretary of state for defense. Most foolishly, the prime minister has made him secretary of state for Scotland as well, which is currently a highly party political appointment. The services are feeling unappreciated, unloved and poorly looked after. For some years I have had the unpleasant feeling in the back of my mind that too much is being asked of them and something could easily go seriously wrong.
The Times suggested Sir Jock gave the interview “because of his growing concern that the public is failing to appreciate what the British troops have been doing in Southern Iraq”. He obviously had in mind some criticism by American generals that British troops have been letting the side down in Basra. Sir Jock felt that the public only gets snapshots:
“... which are sometimes really good and sometimes really bad. In my view, and contrary to what many people may think, the British military in the South of Iraq, against some quite daunting odds, has been successful, and the nonsense about the British having failed in Basra is completely misjudged.”
I thought his next remarks were right on target: “Of course, it does depend upon recognizing what the mission was in the first place, and I’m afraid we did allow some false and inflated expectations to arise. But the mission for the military was to get the place and the people to the state where the Iraqis could run that bit of the country if they chose to.”
He added: “I think we didn’t do a good job, frankly, of setting out the strategic prospect ... and we have not done as well as we should have done at thinking strategically. I’m talking here not just about the military.” He finished with these words:
“I think some people expected that, with the British presence on the ground, we could put Basra society, Basra infrastructure, Basra politics and Basra life back on its feet and make it look like some sort of stable, secure, prosperous urban center. That is the right aspiration to have, but we could never do that, only the Iraqis could to it ... I don’t for a moment pretend that there will be a smooth, uninterrupted progress toward some sort of urban idyll in Basra.”
I have every sympathy with Sir Jock’s predicament and with the soldiers still serving in Basra. I can say what the air chief marshall cannot say namely that from the former Prime Minister Tony Blair downward the British government hopelessly misjudged Iraq from 2003 onward, failed to reach agreement in detail with the Americans on what should follow the fall of Baghdad, and unwisely exaggerated expectations on what could be achieved. For four and a half years the Labour government has been in denial over the true position of British forces in Southern Iraq.
