Not for many years has it been possible to say that progress has been made in Iraq overall, but early in 2008 it is possible to say so. A true assessment would have to note that what has been going forward could easily slip back, political advance has been lagging behind improved security, and many large question marks hang over this Arab state’s future.
A year ago President George Bush announced his new strategy for Iraq. I wrote at the time it looked incredibly foolish, and European opinion was all but united in believing he was making yet another ghastly blunder. It is too early to say “the surge” has or has not worked.
In the summer of 2006 there was a big operation in Baghdad, Iraq’s largest city, involving more than 12,000 US troops. At first it looked as if it might be successful, but by the end of it the gunmen had not been forced out, but had moved around, and the bloodshed then increased.
At the end of 2006, Gen. John Abizaid, head of America’s Central Command, came close to rejecting the idea of “a surge” before a Senate hearing. He thought it would have only a “temporary effect” and was concerned that the US Army’s ground forces could become overstretched. They clearly have become gravely overstretched in Iraq and there will have to be reductions in troop numbers.
I pay tribute to Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of US forces in Iraq, who has had a good year. He is a tough guy and one with a doctorate from Princeton; he has proved himself to be a gifted, imaginative and effective general in the field. What a pity he was not in charge after the fall of Saddam Hussein when stupid and short-sighted actions were taken by the coalition forces. In the American press he is being tipped as a possible vice presidential candidate. I doubt if he will be one, but with his great experience in Iraq, his knowledge of “abroad” — rare for American politicians these days — and knack of getting on with all types of people, he would be an inspired choice.
Of course, the key event in Iraq has been an extraordinary and most encouraging mass defection of man-in-the-street Sunnis from the ranks of Al-Qaeda to the US military. Senior Al-Qaeda leaders are trying to regroup outside Iraq having been forced to abandon Ambar province. The Sunnis over the years began to understand that Al-Qaeda, with its hideous cruelty and disregard for human life, was behind their suffering and hardship, and it was the Americans — who are anxious to get out of Iraq at this stage — who could offer hope of a brighter future and with increased employment and prosperity from oil revenues.
In Ramadi, to the west of Baghdad, as recently as November 2006, Al-Qaeda masked fighters had paraded through the middle of the city shouting that it was to be the new capital of an Islamic caliphate. The American troops were met, time and time again, with highly dangerous improvised explosive devices, suicide car bombers and rocket-propelled grenades. Even the hospital had been taken over by the insurgents.
On Feb. 10, the Americans released two letters, which they are convinced are authentic, written by Al-Qaeda leaders a few months ago. An unnamed emir from Ambar Province wrote:
“Al-Qaeda’s expulsion from Ambar created weakness and psychological defeat. This also created panic, fear and the unwillingness to fight... The morale of the fighters went down ... there was a total collapse in the security structure of the organization.”
Abu-Tariq, an Al-Qaeda leader from north of Baghdad, wrote last October:
“There were almost 600 fighters in our sector before the tribes changed course 360 degrees... Many of our fighters quit and some of them joined the deserters ... As a result of that the number of fighters dropped down to 20 or less.”
The Americans are delighted that some 80,000 Sunnis have become members of the “concerned local citizens” groups which have pushed Al-Qaeda out of much of western and northern Iraq. However, an obvious question to ask is where do the loyalties of such fighters rely lie, and could these well-armed fighters one day turn their weapons on the Shiites, or even the coalition forces as they attempt to scale down their troop numbers?
Another question to ask is what is Moqtada Sadr and the Mehdi Army going to do in the future? He has just ordered an extension to a cease-fire. His fighters remain a major threat to stability in Iraq.
It looks as if 2008 is going to be a crucial year for the country. Some political progress has been made and more must follow without delay.
