Over the past five years the name Mohammed Al-Qahtani — detainee 063 at Guantánamo — has been indelibly associated with the Bush administration’s efforts to justify extreme measures in the “war on terror”. This Saudi was apprehended in Afghanistan in late 2001 and taken to Guantanamo in early 2002, included in a group labeled as the “worst of the worst”. His identity got a full airing in June 2004, as the administration struggled to contain the fallout from the Abu Ghraib pictures.
Alleged to be the 20th hijacker, Al-Qahtani became its justification for abandoning a longstanding prohibition on the use of cruelty by the military. Two of the administration’s most senior lawyers — White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and Defense Department General Counsel Jim Haynes — stood before the world’s media and laid out the official story to explain the move to aggressive interrogation: It occurred as a result of a bottom-up request from an aggressive combatant commander at Guantanamo; it was implemented within the law and on the basis of careful legal advice; and it produced useful and important results.
Al-Qahtani was living proof that coercion worked: He was a person in whom the Pentagon had “a considerable interest”, who had “been trained to resist our interrogation techniques” and, most significantly, who gave up important information when subjected to new techniques authorized by Rumsfeld in December 2002. This included information on José Padilla (the alleged “dirty bomber”) and Richard Reid (the shoe bomber). The message was unambiguous: Qahtani was a bad man, aggressive interrogation works.
A few weeks later, the 9/11 Commission report described Al-Qahtani as a “candidate hijacker”, explaining the circumstances in which he was denied entry to the US in August 2001. The narrative persisted, and Al-Qahtani’s name was frequently wheeled out again in defense of the administration’s actions.
A few weeks ago the Department of Defense announced that Al-Qahtani would join five others in facing a military commission on various criminal charges, including murder, attacking civilians and terrorism. The death penalty would be sought. The allegations were thin on detail and — strikingly — made no reference to any information obtained after the new techniques were used. The announcement was consistent with what, by then, I had already been told: The abusive interrogation of Al-Qahtani produced nothing of value.
The administration raised the stakes on Al-Qahtani. He was presented as the kind of uniquely dangerous person for whom the program of detention and interrogation was designed, proof that the established rules were quaint and obsolete, that new rules and techniques were needed, and that they worked.
Then, earlier this week, the administration made an astonishing announcement: The charges against Al-Qahtani were dropped. Proceedings against five other would continue, but the Pentagon official in charge of war crimes cases declined to authorize charges against Al-Qahtani. What happened?
No explanation was given for the abrupt change of direction. That in itself is telling. There is no plausible reason that can be sold or spun. For the truth is that Al-Qahtani was subject to abuse that most likely rises to the level of torture, in circumstances that are notoriously public around the world. From Nov. 23, 2002, over a period of 54 days, he was subject to aggressive interrogation at the instance of the highest echelons of the administration.
I have written at length explaining how Rumsfeld and his team came to be involved. On Dec. 2 2002 Rumsfeld signed a memo prepared for him by Jim Haynes, authorizing the use of new techniques. It is a famous memo, the one in which Rumsfeld inquires, in his own hand, as to why standing during interrogation is limited to four hours since he stands for eight or more hours a day.
I journeyed around America, meeting many of the principal characters involved in the decision-making process. Al-Qahtani’s treatment amounted to a war crime. The decision to move to aggressive interrogation came from the top down and not, as the administration claimed, from the ground up; those at the top may face war crimes investigations abroad, unless the US gets its house in order. Despite it all, Al-Qahtani’s interrogation provided no meaningful information.
Against this background, the House Judiciary Committee has recently embarked on a series of hearings to examine the role of senior administration lawyers in promoting aggressive interrogations. The treatment of Al-Qahtani lies at the heart of this inquiry. It is a grim story, of decision-making driven by fear and ideology and incompetence, of crime and of cover-up.
It seems likely that the charges against him were dropped because proceedings before a military commission would have turned the spotlight on his treatment and, even more dangerously, on those most senior individuals — politicians and political appointees — with whom responsibility lies.
The abuse of Al-Qahtani has backfired, as many down at Guantánamo predicted it would. The truth of his involvement, if any, in the events of Sept. 11 will not be established. He will no doubt linger in a limbo of legal uncertainty in the bowels of Guantanamo or whatever other place may be found for him, a totemic figure whose treatment will be invoked by those who seek to harm the US.
This unhappy story has brought America’s fine tradition of military valor into disrepute. It has provided no added protection to the country; instead it will serve to inflame public opinion abroad, and undermine the very objective of national security that was sought, making it more difficult to respond to the real threat of international terrorism. If the House Judiciary Committee does nothing else, it must establish the facts, to identify those who are responsible for this mess, to make sure lessons are learned so it doesn’t happen again. The lesson of torture is clear. It does not work.
