AS any psychologist or counselor can confirm, little disputes are rarely the cause of major rows. They can be a flashpoint for something bigger, but that is because there are underlying issues that have been festering away in the background — ignored and unresolved.
The row in Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state, over the state government’s decision to take back the land allotted to a Hindu shrine (Amarnath) should be seen in this context. The land was taken back over Muslim protests.
The reason it has led to unprecedented mass protests, first by Muslims and then by Hindus, is because both the Hindu minority and the Muslim majority in Kashmir have grievances, real and imaginary. Hindus feel that the Muslim-dominated state government is biased against them. Muslims feel the same about the Hindu majority in India. Too many Kashmiris feel they do not belong in India and that India is an alien occupier. For this the federal government in New Delhi is largely to blame. It has consistently seen the Kashmir problem as a military one, believing that if it can stop Pakistan from supporting militants, then the problem is resolved. All that was needed was a political deal with the government in Islamabad to prevent them using Pakistan as a base. There was some truth to this, and the rapprochement with Pakistan while Pervez Musharraf was president saw a significant drop in violence in the territory. But it was not the whole truth. It ignored the fundamental problem — that many Muslim Kashmiris do not want to be part of India.
India has responded to the mass protests by Muslim Kashmiris trying to smother them, with curfews to prevent the unrest, which have spread like a contagion, and force to intimidate the protesters. It is unlikely to work. This is not a military issue any more; it is a mass movement. Kashmir is India’s Northern Ireland, its Basque problem. It cannot maintain curfews indefinitely. The sense of anger and the feeling that change has to come now pervades much of Muslim Kashmir. Delhi cannot keep the lid on that sentiment. It has to find a political solution.
That will not be easy. As the Kashmiri moderates admit, they are now irrelevant. The initiative has passed into the hands of the militants whose sole interest is secession.
There has to be a solution— all the more so because the crisis has the potential to spread poison across the country. Meanwhile, it is becoming clear that the agitation by the Hindus in Jammu, including the virtual blockade of the Kashmir Valley, has nothing to do with the shrine or religious worship. Whatever may be its origin, it is now largely political. This will only alienate the Kashmiri Muslims and deepen their suspicion and distrust of Hindus, vitiating the atmosphere still further.
If not handled with extreme care, the crisis could set back communal relations for years. It also has the potential to poison relations with Pakistan, especially now with it in a political crisis of its own. It would not be altogether surprising if some ruthless politician there now looks to build support by trying to rally public opinion against India. It is too easy an option — but the consequences could be catastrophic.
Given that Kashmir seemed to be stabilizing and that tourists were returning, one has to ask: Why now? Any link with the power vacuum in Pakistan? Even if so, Delhi stands to blame for doing too little to make Kashmiris want to feel Indian. That so many of them want to be part of the economic failure that is Pakistan rather than the economic success that is India is both an indicator of the extent of their alienation and of the fact that India’s success has never made it to them.
