OVER a decade ago a member of Abkhazia Parliament told me that “the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia would not be resolved until Russia and the West divided their spheres of interests”.
We were sitting on the Black Sea coast and I thought that the guy was crazy. Surely, the conflict was between Georgians and Abkhazians, or Georgians and South Ossetians, and it was up to them to resolve their differences. How naive I had been. In his now traditional Valdai encounter with Western experts, Prime Minister Putin confirmed what was obvious to separatist politicians 10 years ago.
The logic of the current discord runs as follows: The West assumes that Russia invaded Georgia in August to punish it for its NATO bid. It would have loved to do so to the Baltic states when they were joining NATO, but had no power at that time. Following this line, Ukraine is to be persecuted next, if not militarily, then politically and economically. Western efforts need to be geared to building a bastion around Ukraine to protect it from being the next victim.
The Russian position, which came out forcefully in Putin’s interview, also relates events in Georgia to wider European context, and explains them in terms of the recognition of Kosovo, which Putin previously called a “terrible precedent”. It forced choices upon Russia which it could have lived without. The timing was especially unfortunate for the new president, Dmitri Medvedev, whose ascension to power was meant to signify a modern liberal Russia ready for constructive engagement with the West. Intervention in Georgia and the subsequent recognition of breakaways cost Russia dear: Not only did relations with the West plummet to the new low, but traditional allies such as Serbia and China grew suspicious of how Moscow might behave in future. The political capital which Russia needs to negotiate successfully on issues that matter has been spent on dealing with the fallout.
And yet, it could not have gone otherwise. When Georgia attacked South Ossetia, Russia had to protect the territory, over which it had a legitimate peacekeeping responsibility. Putin revealed that the decision to go ahead with a full-scale invasion was made only after he spoke to President Bush twice at the Olympics and came to the conclusion that the US was not going to restrain its ally. The army did not enter Tbilisi to facilitate a regime change, despite Mikhail Saakashvili in Russian eyes being the equivalent of Saddam Hussein. Russian forces probably did not need to bomb Gori and Poti to repel the attack, but if Serbian forces invaded Kosovo after recognition, NATO peacekeepers would probably have bombed Belgrade, as they had done a decade ago.
What was done cannot be undone. Both parties mirrored each other’s actions in an attempt to get even. Kosovo had become a liability for the international community which it could not repudiate, and recognition by a coalition of the willing seemed like the least bad outcome. There was little appetite in Moscow for recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but after full-scale fighting broke out, it had no option but to follow the same path. Moreover, the security implications of instability in South Ossetia for the North Caucasus should not be underestimated: The situation on the Russia’s Georgian border is not exactly like that on its border with Estonia.
A realistic solution to the fate of minorities in Europe has to be found, even if that meant adding more states to the European map. Andorra, Monaco and Liechtenstein exist without endangering the security of their neighbors, who in theory could project historical claims upon these territories. The debate needs to move from “Who is to blame?” to “What needs to be done?” about a real problem of breakaway territories in Europe.
Realpolitik aside, the emotive tone of the Russian-Western relations is remarkable. Putin’s frustration with Western readiness to blame the Kremlin for everything, its bitterness toward “Russia experts” who are supposed to know better than to resurrect a Soviet threat and Moscow’s inability to counterbalance it with a positive image make his outburst at Valdai very personal.
This frustration is shared across the board in the Russian society. The difference between Soviet and Russian citizens is that now the public trusts the government more, especially on the foreign-policy front. When Politburo leaders claimed that the bloody imperialists were planning to attack, people hardly believed them. The general sense was that this was an excuse to justify the system’s failure to provide a decent standard of living for the population.
In contrast, Putin’s essential message of “they do not like us because we don’t smell right” finds more public support.
And for me, this is the most remarkable change since the Soviet era.
