Allowing the violence to escalate would only create the conditions for another military coup in Thailand which has seen 10 of them since 1932, said The Guardian in an editorial yesterday. The only solution is to find a leadership capable of bridging the Thai social and political divide, said the British newspaper. Excerpts:
The conviction of the former Thai prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, on a corruption charge over the purchase of land in Bangkok and his sentence in absentia to two years in prison were expected. The surprise was that the Supreme Court had allowed Thaksin and his wife Potjaman to leave the country in the first place. They were bailed on the pretext that they should attend the opening of the Olympics in Beijing, but they flew to London instead where they have been ever since. At the time, it was speculated that the couple had been given the nod to flee into exile in the hope of ending the political crisis. But the crisis continues.
Thaksin’s second stand-in as prime minister, his brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat, is in as much trouble as his predecessor, Samak Sundaravej, who was sacked for moonlighting as a television chef. In the four weeks since he was sworn in, Somchai has been unable to enter his office, which is occupied by opposition supporters, and has been forced to climb over fences to escape protesters. Yesterday he fled an angry crowd who threw shoes and water bottles at him while shouting “murderer” — and they were state workers. If the rule of law were to be upheld, Britain should extradite Thaksin and his wife back to Thailand, the opposition should release its stranglehold on government and Samak should call fresh elections.
But none of the likely outcomes are particularly appealing. Behind Thailand’s violent political crisis lies a deeply entrenched power battle between an urban royalist and liberal elite, represented by the opposition, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), and the rural poor, championed by Thaksin’s People Power Party (PPP). Both claim to represent the popular will — and each time an election is held Thaksin’s party wins — but neither are democratic. PAD want a Parliament that is 70 percent appointed and 30 percent elected, but a return of Thaksin is also troubling. He earned his popularity in the north and northeast of the country with low-cost healthcare and village development funds, but the populist tycoon has no legitimacy to rule while he has a case to answer before a court of law.
The more violent PAD demonstrations become, the easier it will be for Thaksin to claim before a British court that the charges against him are politically motivated. Calling another election would also do little to alter the underlying dynamic, as a new government would inevitably contain pro-Thaksin factions. But allowing the violence to escalate would only create the conditions for another military coup. There have been 10 of them since 1932. The only solution is to find a leadership capable of bridging the Thai social and political divide, but it is not yet evident where that will come from.
