THANKS to politics as usual, Israel is once again headed for early elections. In the six decades since the state’s establishment, Israel has had 31 different governments, and the elections now expected in February 2009 will be the fifth since the mid-1990s. It is, therefore, somewhat disingenuous to suggest that Kadima leader Tzipi Livni is looking “like a loser” because she failed in her efforts to form a government. As many analysts have pointed out, Israel’s political system based on pure proportional representation is not only “chronically dysfunctional”, but has also depleted the country’s political energies and distorted its political forces for decades.
When Livni was appointed to form a government after her narrow victory in the Kadima primaries in mid-September, she apparently expected that it would not be too difficult to maintain the existing coalition of Kadima (29 seats), Labor (19), the Sephardi-ultra Orthodox Shas party (12), and the Pensioners’ party (7), and perhaps add the left-wing Meretz party (5) that signaled its willingness to join. Such a coalition would have resulted in a stable government with a solid majority in the 120-seat Knesset that could have completed the two years remaining from the current government’s term, and Livni was arguably right to suggest that this would be in the country’s best interest.
But after lengthy coalition negotiations, particularly with Shas, Livni reportedly told her advisers that she was “sick of this extortion” — and given the spectacle of the past few weeks, this is a healthy reaction. A concise description of the coalition negotiations was offered by Meretz Chairman Haim Oron, who observed sarcastically that “the fate of the people of Israel is determined between the morning prayer at (Shas spiritual leader) Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and (Labour chairman Ehud) Barak’s respect-games.” Labor leader Barak certainly earned little respect when he insisted in the coalition negotiations that he should have the rather meaningless title of “senior deputy prime minister, second only to the prime minister”; on the other hand, Shas Chairman Eli Yishai conducted himself just as anybody would have expected, insisting on large hand-outs to benefit his constituency and guarantees that there would be no offer to divide Jerusalem in the ongoing negotiations with the Palestinians.
Livni emphasized in her remarks about her decision to seek early elections that it was a prime minister’s duty “to advance the interests of the state ... Anyone willing to sell their principles for the prime minister’s chair does not deserve to sit in it.” In an apparent reference to reports that Likud Chairman Benjamin Netanyahu had vowed to comply with Shas’ demands if he is elected prime minister, she added: “There are others who are willing to pay any price, but I am not willing to sell the state and its citizens only to become the prime minister.” The bitter irony is that there is also a very real price to be paid for early elections, and the cost of the elections may turn out to be as high, and perhaps even higher, as the budget that would have been required to meet the demands of Shas for additional welfare payments. But since this is, of course, a time when all Israeli politicians are eager to present themselves as guardians of the nation’s best interest, Shas insisted that it wasn’t really the money that doomed the coalition talks, but rather the resolve not to sell Jerusalem for a few shekels.
What impact Livni’s failure to form a government and the resulting elections will have on the prospects for peace is obviously a question that is already being asked by many. The assessments are generally pessimistic, not least because most polls forecast a highly competitive race between Tzipi Livni and Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, who is a sharp critic of the ongoing peace talks with the Palestinians.
But even if Livni were to win the elections, it is far from certain that she would then be in a better position to form a government committed to the goal of negotiating a peace agreement. Given Israel’s political system, it is very unlikely that the election results will produce a clear mandate, and the winner will once again have to cobble together a coalition of political forces with sharply divergent ideologies and narrow sectarian interests, producing yet another government that will be little suited to withstand the challenges involved in making historic decisions.
