It is rapidly becoming a truism that all problems in the Middle East are so intertwined that they must be all negotiated into tolerance and disarmament at more or less the same time — not sequentially as before. Still, it is better in an analysis such as this to single out Iran, because if Iran can be set right, then a lot of the other dominoes will be easier to fit into place. It is Iran that Israel fears most. It is Iran that has much influence on Hamas. It is Iran that can contribute significantly to peace in Iraq and Lebanon.
And to discuss Iran, we must talk about Libya. Libya only a few years ago had many of the same problems as Iran today. Not only was it on the cusp of producing nuclear weapons, it was supposedly a terrorist state. The downing over Lockerbie of a US airliner was only the apogee of a continuous line of terrorist activity over a period. Yet by careful diplomacy, its teeth were gradually drawn, and in September last year Condoleezza Rice, on a visit to Tripoli, declared the rapprochement with Libya was “an historic event.”
Regime change was replaced by policy change, an important positive influence on Muammar Qaddafi and one that the US and Britain kept stressing. It had become clear that militant tactics by Washington added strength to Qaddafi’s uncertain political base at home.
Moreover, later there were clear signals by Washington and London that they were not going to push for too much on their Lockerbie compensation demands — there would not be legal action against Libya. Washington’s less confrontational policy enabled it to win a unanimous UN Security Council vote in favor of tough sanctions in 1992. Libya soon began to face severe economic problems, compounded by falling oil prices.
To the surprise of many, Qaddafi faced growing opposition, as his hold on Libya deteriorated. This had a big effect on him, encouraging to reach out to moderates in both the Middle East and Europe.
Progress continued. Libya increasingly restrained its behavior in its African backyard. In 1999, Libya offered to give up its weapons of mass destruction programs. In 2000, it surrendered the two thugs suspected in the Lockerbie bombing.
In March 2003, the Lockerbie legal case was settled with an agreement of a Libyan donation of $2.7 billion to the bereaved families. The trial of the Lockerbie suspects began in a Scottish court a year later. Also in October 2003, US and British technical teams were allowed into Libya to inspect weapons’ sites, laboratories and factories. On Dec. 19, 2003, just after the capture of Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi agreed to totally abolish his weapons of mass destruction. But Cheney missed out a lot.
While one can’t underestimate the impact of America’s decision to invade Iraq in March 2003, Qaddafi could also see how quickly the Americans had got bogged down both there and in Afghanistan. The sanctions bothered him much more, particularly the high-tech ones, necessary for the modernization of its increasingly rundown oil industry.
While the continuous threat of US force was probably a factor it was not “the” factor. Active diplomacy rather than activating military pressure made it possible for Libyans to feel that they were not conceding from a position of weakness; rather they were acting out of self-interest.
The lesson to be learned for Iran is that steady diplomacy and sanctions can win the day, as long as military threats are played down. Moreover, in Iran’s case it is important to improve the atmosphere that counts for Iranians — by being much, much tougher on Israel, by pursuing vigorously a two-state solution before it is too late, by encouraging Israel to make peace with Syria and not resisting Iran’s relationship with the Shiites of Iraq.
— Jonathan Power is a foreign affairs commentator. He is based in London.
