When Barack Obama entered the White House on 21 Jan. 21, a lot of people around the world were expecting some serious changes to American foreign policy. So far, they are probably disappointed — and nowhere is this more evident than in Washington’s Afghanistan policy.
The situation in Afghanistan is grave. There are around 70,000 international troops on the ground and a good deal of economic assistance has been pumped into the country. But uncoordinated international efforts, rampant corruption within the Afghan government and a lack of strategic focus on the underlying problems in Afghanistan and the wider region has meant that despite international investments in blood and treasure the situation is worse than at any point since the initial military operations in 2001.
On Thursday the White House announced that an additional 17,000 US troops will be sent to the region, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is headed to Europe for the first time as a representative of the Obama administration to push NATO allies for additional troops.
This is all well and good — in theory more troops should reduce NATO’s reliance on airpower, which resulted in unacceptably high civilian casualties in 2008. More troops should enable the US to capture better secure transportation routes and major cities. But they will not be able to blanket the country and they will not improve the lack of strategic cohesion. The current US Army Field Manual, written in part by Gen. David Petraeus, now in charge of central command and operations in Afghanistan, calls for over 500,000 troops to supposedly conduct counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.
So there is good reason for concern that the US has not fully thought through the desired strategic effect of this new “surge”. Especially given that the multiple reviews of the war in Afghanistan being conducted in various parts of the US government have yet to be completed.
A few weeks ago at the Munich security conference, US Vice President Joe Biden, said:
“We believe that international alliances and organizations do not diminish America’s power — they help us to advance our collective security, economic interests and values. So we will engage. We will listen. We will consult.”
But at the moment, there is very little engaging, listening or consulting. Instead, Washington has once again said this is what we are doing; now you pull some more weight too.
The problem is that the Obama team has thus far failed to address any of the underlying issues that have stymied the mission to date. They have gambled that the Europeans can’t say no to the enormously popular US president. But Obama’s popularity does not change the fact that the European public does not believe the mission in Afghanistan is directly related to their security. Obama’s popularity does not alter the fact that the various bits of the international community are too busy defending their turf, rather than working together to create common solutions. And Obama’s popularity certainly does not redress the lack of agreement in the desired end-state for Afghanistan. Washington may be realigning its priorities and goals — but what do the Europeans think? So far, no one has really asked them — but do send more troops please.
Far from a stronger, more multilateral approach, we are in danger of an increasingly fragmented strategy. The US has now appointed Richard Holbrooke to lead American efforts. Yet another cook in the kitchen who joins Gen. Petraeus, US Gen. McKiernan (ISAF), UN envoy Kai Eide and NATO’s senior civilian representative, Fernando Gentilini, as well as a host of Western ambassadors who are all concerned with “their” bit of the Afghan mission, whether it be the Brits in Helmand, the Canadians in Kandahar or the Germans in Kunduz.
If Washington is serious about putting Afghanistan on a better, more sustainable track it would behoove the White House to truly reach out to NATO and the wider international community by holding a high-level, off-the-record conference on the issue. Of course, current operations cannot be put on hold, but such a review would provide the allies with an opportunity to create a truly common strategy, with agreed-upon strategic ends that fit within the domestic political realities of the individual allies. Engaging, listening and consulting would be a good place to start indeed — it is time to turn rhetoric into action, especially if Obama wants to see results in Afghanistan.
