BEYOND America’s Grasp: A Century of Failed Diplomacy in the Middle East,” attempts to explain from an American perspective the reasons behind Washington’s recurrent pattern of diplomatic failures in the Middle East. The author, Stephen Cohen, lectured at Yale, Harvard, Princeton as well as Middle Eastern institutions such as the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. During his extensive travels to the region he met many intellectuals, business people, political leaders, writers and journalists; he acknowledges Osama El-Baz, the senior political adviser to Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, Boutros Boutros Ghali, Shimon Peres, King Hussein of Jordan and Hani Al-Hassan, political adviser to Chairman Yasser Arafat as a few of his outstanding teachers.
This book, based on a lifetime’s experience, analyzes the role of the United States in the Middle East from the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. The beginning of the twentieth century signals the emergence of the US on the international scene. During the first century of its existence, the aim of American foreign policy was to ensure that its economic development would not be hindered by the policies of the Great Powers of Europe and their race to colonize.
Cohen rightly points out that from the very start, America’s foreign policy was based on conflicting positions toward Britain. These different viewpoints were expressively embraced by two American presidents who led the United States onto the world scene at the turn of the twentieth century. Theodore Roosevelt was the first imperial president and Woodrow Wilson the first anti-imperial president.
“The tension between these different approaches to America’s role in the world has never been resolved; they both continue to find expression in the debate on US foreign policy, and especially foreign policy toward the Middle East,” Cohen writes.
Wilson wanted the United States to initiate a change in world politics that would put an end to imperialism but his ideas never turned into action. His plan for self-determination and independence was very well received by the people of the Ottoman Empire. Under intense pressure to return to America, Wilson left the Paris Peace Conference which was set to decide the future of the Ottoman Arab countries. This inflicted a severe blow to the hopes of the people in the region. The British and the French did not share Wilson’s ideas concerning self-determination. They had other plans which resulted in the creation of mandates that left an everlasting impact on the Middle East.
The British established Iraq with three rival groups — the Sunnis, the Shiites, and Kurds. Only an autocratic ruler could govern such a country and this effectively materialized under the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Lebanon which was part of the French mandate is another case in point. It is presently ungovernable. Its large Shiite population no longer accepts the legitimacy of a constitution which gives it only a tertiary role. America could have played a positive role by using the principles it advocated to create a just Ottoman settlement. Its absence from a crucial stage regarding the future of the region caused anger and disappointment and was even seen as a betrayal by the people of the region.
“To understand the history of America in the Middle East, we must pause to point out that the advocacy of Wilson, with its wide gap between his high principles and the emergent political situation on the ground, was the beginning of the perennially vexing problem of the Arab and Muslim perception of the United States. This problem is one of perceived hypocrisy and double standards, the belief that the United States advocates great values and, when it comes to Arab states, often acts in direct contradiction to them,” Cohen writes.
The United States would manifest a renewed interest in the Middle East in the 1930s with the discovery of oil. One should point out that an American politician, whether Democrat or Republican, will always view foreign diplomacy in terms of economic development and foreign trade. Furthermore, American civil society has always traditionally played an important role by establishing influential educational institutions such as the Protestant College of Beirut — which became the American University in Beirut which has educated key personalities of the region. Wilson was the first president to begin the tradition of American Middle Eastern foreign policy’s being heavily influenced by American civil society’s concerns and lobbies.
Stephen Cohen proceeds to analyze in detail America’s relationship with Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. In a concise manner, he shows how these countries dealt with America’s Middle East policy characterized by a dual approach, a constant confrontation between its idealism and realpolitik. World War II marked the beginning of the American-Egyptian relationship. At that time, Egypt was still occupied by the British who regarded it in terms of its commitment to the future of India. After the war, Egyptians became increasingly upset with the British presence which has been there since 1882 but King Farouk failed to push out Britain and also refused to implement land reforms. Moreover, the Egyptian soldiers who had been defeated in the Palestinian war blamed the king for their lack of arms and training. Eventually, the Young Officers staged a bloodless coup on July 23, 1952.
Primarily focused on the threat of communism, the Americans ignored Nasser’s Pan-Arabist ideals and this negatively affected the existing alliance between the countries. One should keep in mind that even after World War II and despite its focus on oil supplies, the United States still considered the Middle East a region outside its field of interest. It was only after the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace treaty that the US strengthened its relationship with Egypt which is, with Israel, the largest recipient of American foreign aid in the region.
Contrary to America, the Soviet Union during the cold war, recognized the Arab countries yearning for nationalism and used that nationalism to serve its own political agenda. The US had a tendency to confuse nationalism with communism and like George Bush’s famous. “You are either with us or against us,” countries were urged to make a choice between the East or the West. However, if the Americans can very well define their enemies, it is more difficult to know who their friends really are. History has shown how swiftly the US can withdraw its support to serve its own purposes.
Throughout the book, the author highlights the United State’s shortcomings. He criticizes the American’s lack of openness to the Arab Muslim enthusiasm for their religious culture and their solidarity with fellow Arabs and believes that the Arabs ability to maintain cohesiveness, at a time when Islam is so much threatened, is a remarkable quality.
“We have not given enough attention to understanding and relating to the internal struggles of the Islamic and Arab worlds so that they would be perceived, not as the target of American wrath but as a fellow human community, to which Americans could and would offer a hand of friendship and cooperation as they struggle through the difficult early stages of economic and social development,” writes Stephen Cohen.
His call for a greater awareness in the Middle East culminates in the last chapter where he hopes the US will understand the importance of switching from the war of ideas to the peace of ideas and reaching for a common ground beyond the historical triangle of disagreement between the Arabs, Israel and the US “Beyond America’s Grasp” offers a brilliant analysis of United States foreign policy in the Middle East thanks to the author’s in-depth knowledge and understanding of the region.
Stephen Cohen gives us a thorough assessment of the diplomatic blunders, the tactical mistakes, the missed opportunities and, most of all, the shortsighted national self-interest as well as the cultural blindness that have characterized US policy in the Middle East.
