Pakistan views nuclear weapons as a guarantee of its independence and physical integrity; they have made it possible for a weaker state to defend itself against a larger and more powerful adversary.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Western nations, particularly their think tanks and the media, started to propagate their fears about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. On Sept. 18, 2001, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) raised concerns that ‘‘increased instability in Pakistan could make Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and stocks of nuclear explosive material dangerously vulnerable to theft by militant groups.”
To question the safety of Pakistan nuclear arsenal amounts to doubting the very guarantee that assures the existence and survival of the country. It is equally unlikely that terrorists could steal Pakistan nuclear weapons or fissile material. It is true that the authority of Pakistan is being challenged throughout Pakistan, especially in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan. In the most troubled regions, police and military forces are stretched to maintain order. However, the installations that house Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and fissile material are heavily guarded and among the most secure facilities in all of Pakistan.
Pakistan has made its nuclear weapons as secure as other nuclear-weapon states have done. Since the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistani authorities have taken different measures to safeguard the country’s nuclear assets. The first step in this regard was the creation of the 10-member National Command Authority (NCA) in 1990 to “ensure security and safety of the nuclear establishments, nuclear materials” and to safeguard all “information and technology related to the security and safety of the Strategic Organization.” With the establishment of NCA and Strategic Plan Division (SPD), the permanent secretariat of the NCA, the management of nuclear weapons acquired “institutionalized capability.” On May 28, 2009, the director of arms control and disarmament affairs at the SPD, Air Commodore Khalid Banuri, claimed that Pakistan has a large force of nearly 10,000 people deployed to keep vigil on the country’s nuclear arsenal. As far as physical security of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons and infrastructure is concerned, the nuclear establishments are distributed geographically.
There is a multilayered system of security over these nuclear installations. This includes highly trained special forces at the inner perimeter, air defense system, no-fly zones, fencing of structures, monitoring by state-of-the-art equipment. Close-circuit cameras, sensors, and checkpoints at second and third level, and counterintelligence teams to identify any threat to nuclear installations. Pakistan has a lot of sophisticated equipment for the security of its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories.
In 2001, in an effort to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, former President Pervez Musharraf ordered the redeployment of nuclear weapons to at least six secret new locations, and organized the military oversight of nuclear forces. In order to avoid the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear warheads are separated or “de-mated” from the missiles or bombs casing that would carry them in an attack and only put into operation with the consent of NC. In addition to their disassembled status, Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are now equipped with Permissive Action Link (PAL), a sophisticated type of lock used to prevent unauthorized launching. Pakistan has developed its own PAL systems which obviously ensure that even if an unauthorized person get holds of a weapon, he cannot activate it unless he also has access to the electronic codes.
Pakistan follows a two-man rule to authenticate the codes that call for the release of the weapons. As far as transportation of nuclear weapons and material is concerned, Pakistan is relying on secrecy in transporting its nuclear weapons rather than a highly visible security profile.
Pakistan’s nuclear export control framework is governed by a single legislation, the “Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Means Act, 2004.” This act strengthens control on the export, re-export, transshipment and transit of goods and technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and missiles capable of delivering such weapons. The act extends to whole of Pakistan and maintains a control list that is consistent with the Nuclear Supplier Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group. Exporters are required to maintain detailed inventories and records and to notify the relevant authority if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended to be used in connection with weapons. Offenders face tough penalties, which include imprisonment of up to 14 years, a fine of up to five million rupees, and the seizure of all assets and property. A particular worry about Pakistan is that scientists and engineers within its nuclear program may share weapons information with other countries or Islamist groups. To avoid such happenings, Pakistan has also set up a personal reliability system of the type used by the United States to continually monitor the financial status, material condition, mental health and other aspects of officials in the nuclear system to ensure they are not disloyal or vulnerable to bribery of blackmail. Similarly, a Human Reliability Program (HRP) has been instituted for all military personnel involved with the nuclear forces in Pakistan. Furthermore, National Command Authority Ordinance, 2007, gives the SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct, and can send for up to 25 years of imprisonment any serving and retired personnel, including military personnel, notwithstanding any other laws. Pakistan is so much conscious about its nuclear program and it is using its own technology to safeguard it.
