Astana troika seek Syria solution amid domestic woes

In an article I wrote for Arab News in mid-January, I underlined that Iran would not remain sidelined in the Turkiye-Syria normalization process, despite the fact that Iranian officials were not invited to the Russian-mediated meeting between the Syrian and Turkish defense ministers and intelligence chiefs in Moscow in late December.

A few days after that meeting, the news of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s upcoming visits to Turkiye and Syria occupied the agenda, although these have not been realized to date. On Jan. 17, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian embarked on an official visit to Turkiye to prepare the ground for the president’s first visit to the country since he took office approaching two years ago. Amid all these diplomatic moves, the devastating earthquakes struck both Turkiye and Syria, keeping all foreign policy issues off the agenda for some weeks.

The news of Raisi’s planned visits was crucial, as it confirmed that, rather than being sidelined, Tehran aims to be a part of the normalization process not only in rhetoric, but also in practice. After years of enmity, Turkiye-Syria relations are set to enter a new stage and Russia is spearheading the normalization process. And Iranian efforts to carve out a new role in the latest phase of the Syrian crisis have paid off.

On Wednesday, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu announced that the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkiye, Syria and Iran will meet in Moscow next week, ahead of planned talks between the respective foreign ministers later. The Syrian and Turkish foreign ministers are expected to gather soon following that December high-level meeting between defense ministers and intelligence chiefs. However, the process has apparently hit a snag.

Cavusoglu’s announcement came at a joint conference he held with his Iranian counterpart, who was paying a solidarity visit to Turkiye after the devastating earthquakes. Cavusoglu said his Iranian counterpart wanted to join the talks between Turkiye, Syria and Russia, and Ankara happily agreed. The possibility of a ministerial meeting between Cavusoglu and his Syrian counterpart Faisal Mekdad in a four-way format will depend on the outcome and success of the meeting in Moscow.

Iranian efforts to carve out a new role in the latest phase of the Syrian crisis have paid off.

Sinem Cengiz

The Turkish foreign minister also made a significant reference to the Astana peace process, which was launched by Turkiye, Russia and Iran in 2017. He said Astana was the “only surviving format” for Syria, as several other attempts — mainly Western-led — had failed to achieve any progress. Now, Syria’s inclusion at the table changes the format. Damascus turns from being the topic to an actor with a seat at the table. In this regard, the quadripartite meeting will mark a rare yet significant high-ranking discussion.

What role and influence Iran might have in bringing together the top diplomats from Ankara and Damascus is an important question. Both Tehran and Moscow firmly support a rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara. During the Syrian conflict, Russia and Iran have pursued different but complementary — rather than conflicting — goals, which helped the Damascus regime to survive on multiple fronts while enhancing their own spheres of influence in Syria and beyond.

Meanwhile, Turkiye has different objectives in Syria than both Russia and Iran. In contrast to them, Turkiye has been severely affected by the Syrian conflict in terms of refugee flows and terrorist attacks, as well as economically and sociologically. One of Turkiye’s main aims in joining the Astana initiative was to secure its national interests and minimize the costs of the Syrian conflict.

At first, its stance in the Astana peace process was that the downfall of the regime and a handover of power, by force if required, was necessary. Gradually, Turkiye’s priority changed from the ouster of Bashar Assad to the prevention of Kurdish aspirations for independent statehood. Turkiye’s relations with both Russia and Iran, the deterioration of its relations with the US, and changing power equations on the battlefield have all played a significant role in this shift in priorities.

All parties support the territorial integrity of Syria, as the partition of the country would be of no benefit to any of them and may even cause significant losses.

Today, after more than a decade of involvement in the conflict, all three countries — Turkiye, Russia and Iran — are unlikely to leave Syria, as they see a future for themselves in the country and are more interested in compartmentalizing their differences than clashing over them. However, all three are now facing serious problems at home. Turkiye is in an ongoing political and economic crisis, with a critical election to be held in a matter of weeks. Iran has been challenged by popular upheaval against its political establishment, which could have a destabilizing effect on its foreign policy goals. And Russia is struggling with the consequences of the Ukraine war, which has already passed its first anniversary.

However, despite all these hurdles, Syria is a crucial part of these countries’ foreign policy in the region. It is very interesting in terms of time and context that all three are seriously challenged on different fronts, both domestic and foreign, but they still want to speed up the process on Syria.