Can Europe salvage long-term peace?

Of all the problems raised by the Russian campaign against Ukraine, the future of the European defense architecture is probably the most important. Discordant voices will, of course, be raised by different members of the EU because their interests vary. As expected, the countries that have voiced their disagreements are France and Germany, because the difference between the policies of these two countries are more at variance with those of the US.

Washington’s priority is to capitalize on the relative weakness of Russia vis-a-vis NATO, as such an opportunity may not arise again any time soon. Russia will not collapse entirely, so weakening it as much as possible is a legitimate aim in the American leaders’ minds. The US also wants to use this opportunity to boost its own defense industry, to create more jobs and to sell more weapons. In the field of the economy, Washington would like to prevent the pumping of Russian natural gas to European countries and sell as much US shale gas as possible.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, for their part, are more concerned about the European defense architecture than the trans-Atlantic one because, in the long run, they will have close economic ties with the gigantic Russia at their doorstep. Furthermore, France and Germany have had relations with Russia for a longer time, although they also fought intense wars.

Antagonism between the trans-Atlantic community and Russia is not expected to continue indefinitely. There will be a new defense architecture in Europe with or without Russia. When the hostilities come to an end, Russian gas will be available at a cheaper price than the liquefied US shale gas. Overdependence on American shale gas also has its disadvantages. Furthermore, some EU countries have few alternatives to Russian gas. Therefore, part of the existing gas pipeline network may remain in use for a period whose length is difficult to foretell.

France and Germany’s attitude should not be perceived as a weakness in front of Russia. These two countries raise their voice because the European defense architecture will be more complete by taking into account the Russian factor. Ignoring a country the size of Russia would be grossly negligent.

Antagonism between the trans-Atlantic community and Russia is not expected to continue indefinitely.

Yasar Yakis

Neither France nor Germany have reduced the degree of their support for Ukraine. As two major powers in Europe, they do not want to ignore the elephant in the room, which is Russia. France has already started to gather evidence of war crimes, hoping that high-level Russian figures will be brought to justice in the International Criminal Court.

After the Russian campaign against Ukraine, Germany launched an ambitious program of defense spending and developed a long-term strategy aiming at deterring Moscow. It has designated a brigade to Lithuania. Such moves may not change the power balance or change the course of events in the war, but are still strong messages to the other side.

Three other countries may constitute another category in Europe. They are the UK, Finland and Poland. After Brexit, the UK again considers itself as an arbiter in conflicts among European countries, though its weight has diminished as the decades have gone by. Finland proved to be a hard nut to crack during the Second World War. Now that it is going to join NATO, it is a much safer country and it may adopt a less timid attitude toward Russia. Poland has been invaded and partitioned three times in its history. This historical background must haunt it from time to time.

Central European countries are not exposed to a direct threat; neither are the Mediterranean countries.

It is true that Russia has an innate drive to expand and regain its lost imperial territories. It invaded Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014 and now Ukraine in 2022. The international community is unlikely to allow this impunity to continue any longer.

France also tried at the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, but it was more for the sake of not being left behind Turkiye, which was enjoying good relations with both Moscow and Kyiv. France is of course a bigger player in the international arena, but the circumstances were more in favor of Turkiye playing the mediation role.

Ankara played a similar positive role in the grain deal agreed in the summer. On this subject, Turkiye has used its leverage of the Montreux Convention, which makes it a custodian of the Turkish Straits. As grain has to be shipped from the Black Sea to the international markets, these straits are the most suitable checkpoint for ships.

Otto von Bismarck, the most influential architect of German unification, used to say that “the great questions will not be decided through speeches and majority decisions, but by iron and blood.” His country may now have given up this method, but Russia continues to use it.